HomeFeaturesDailyBriefingsRapidReconSpecial ReportsAbout Us

Text: Draft Sanctions Resolution on Iran

The text of the Draft Sanctions Resolution on Iran makes clear exception to anything related to Iran's Bushehr nuclear plant construction, currently under contract with Russia for completion.

14. Decides, with regard to the construction of Bushehr I Civil Nuclear Power Plant and on the condition that activities set out in subparagraphs (a) to (d) below are notified to the Committee within ten days of taking place, that;
(a.) the measures imposed by paragraph 4 and 5 above shall not apply to supplies of items, materials, equipment, goods and technology, nor to the provision of technical assistance or training, financial assistance, investment, brokering or other services, and the transfer of financial resources, related to the construction of Bushehr I, where these are being provided directly by the Russian Federation,

(b.) the measures imposed by paragraph 7 above shall not apply where such travel, directly between Iran and the Russian Federation, is necessary for the construction of Bushehr I,

(c.) the measures imposed by paragraph 9 above shall not apply to funds, other financial assets or economic resources payable to the Russian Federation by Iran, related to the construction of Bushehr I,

(d.) the measures imposed by paragraph 13 above shall not apply to assistance provided solely to Iran by the IAEA, related to the construction of Bushehr I,

(e.) all other activities related to Bushehr I which are covered by the measures in paragraphs 4, 5, 7, 9 and 13 above must be approved in advance and on a case by case basis by the Committee;

The rest of the text - as proposed but unaffirmed - spells out the restrictions sought to be placed on Iran, including but not limited to travel of those involved in Iran's nuclear and ballistic missile programs, the sale of items that can be used for the programs, and the refusal of training abroad in related fields.

Such restrictions are logical as presented. Yet, as Paragraph 14 above clearly states, the logic stops at Bushehr.

With a draft proposal [made available here] that calls for the cessation of all enrichment activities - including ceasing construction of Iran's heavy water reactor at Arak - the wisdom of an exception in all restrictions for the Islamic Republic's largest nuclear reactor is more than questionable. The reasons for it are clear: Consensus requires Russian approval, and Putin's Russia has a greater interest in a partnership with the Iranian regime than countering the potential acquisition of nuclear weapons by the world's primary state sponsor of international terrorism.

Glasnost should be officially declared dead.

It should be recalled that during the 2003 US invasion of Iraq, Russian 'advisors' were in Baghdad, feeding intelligence and, some say, directing Hussein's military defense against American forces.

With the Hussein regime gone, Iran represents Russia's primary seat of influence at the Middle Eastern power table. The Bushehr sanctions exception both recognizes and solidifies this.

(With thanks to Iran Vajahan for publishing draft text.)