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Full Text of the al-Zarqawi Letter

Earlier today, we discussed a single point within the letter from the Ba'athist insurgency leadership to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi's al-Qaeda in Iraq network. There are many to be considered. (Thanks to Dan Darling for alerting us to this last night.)

In an e-mail, Thomas Joscelyn asks the following, noting al-Qaeda in Iraq's ties specifically to the Fedayeen Saddam.

And what did Saddam's ultra-loyal Fedayeen have to say about the demise of Zarqawi?

"Although there were many matters we differed with him on and him with us, ... what united us was something greater," said the statement by the Fedayeen Saddam. It said the group had "the honor" of fighting alongside Zarqawi and that "our determination is only increased for waging jihad."

Below is the full text of the Zarqawi letter, revealing in many ways.

________________________________________________

The situation and conditions of the resistance in Iraq have reached a point that requires a review of the events and of the work being done inside Iraq. Such a study is needed in order to show the best means to accomplish the required goals, especially that the forces of the National Guard have succeeded in forming an enormous shield protecting the American forces and have reduced substantially the losses that were solely suffered by the American forces. This is in addition to the role, played by the Shi'a (the leadership and masses) by supporting the occupation, working to defeat the resistance and by informing on its elements.

As an overall picture, time has been an element in affecting negatively the forces of the occupying countries, due to the losses they sustain economically in human lives, which are increasing with time. However, here in Iraq, time is now beginning to be of service to the American forces and harmful to the resistance for the following reasons:

1. By allowing the American forces to form the forces of the National Guard, to reinforce them and enable them to undertake military operations against the resistance.

2. By undertaking massive arrest operations, invading regions that have an impact on the resistance, and hence causing the resistance to lose many of its elements.

3. By undertaking a media campaign against the resistance resulting in weakening its influence inside the country and presenting its work as harmful to the population rather than being beneficial to the population.

4. By tightening the resistance's financial outlets, restricting its moral options and by confiscating its ammunition and weapons.

5. By creating a big division among the ranks of the resistance and jeopardizing its attack operations, it has weakened its influence and internal support of its elements, thus resulting in a decline of the resistance's assaults.

6. By allowing an increase in the number of countries and elements supporting the occupation or at least allowing to become neutral in their stand toward us in contrast to their previous stand or refusal of the occupation.

7. By taking advantage of the resistance's mistakes and magnifying them in order to misinform.

Based on the above points, it became necessary that these matters should be treated one by one:

1. To improve the image of the resistance in society, increase the number of supporters who are refusing occupation and show the clash of interest between society and the occupation and its collaborators. To use the media for spreading an effective and creative image of the resistance.

2. To assist some of the people of the resistance to infiltrate the ranks of the National Guard in order to spy on them for the purpose of weakening the ranks of the National Guard when necessary, and to be able to use their modern weapons.

3. To reorganize for recruiting new elements for the resistance.

4. To establish centers and factories to produce and manufacture and improve on weapons and to produce new ones.

5. To unify the ranks of the resistance, to prevent controversies and prejudice and to adhere to piety and follow the leadership.

6. To create division and strife between American and other countries and among the elements disagreeing with it.

7. To avoid mistakes that will blemish the image of the resistance and show it as the enemy of the nation.

In general and despite the current bleak situation, we think that the best suggestions in order to get out of this crisis is to entangle the American forces into another war against another country or with another of our enemy force, that is to try and inflame the situation between American and Iraq or between America and the Shi'a in general.

Specifically the Sistani Shi'a, since most of the support that the Americans are getting is from the Sistani Shi'a, then, there is a possibility to instill differences between them and to weaken the support line between them; in addition to the losses we can inflict on both parties. Consequently, to embroil America in another war against another enemy is the answer that we find to be the most appropriate, and to have a war through a delegate has the following benefits:

1. To occupy the Americans by another front will allow the resistance freedom of movement and alleviate the pressure imposed on it.

2. To dissolve the cohesion between the Americans and the Shi'a will weaken and close this front.

3. To have a loss of trust between the Americans and the Shi'a will cause the Americans to lose many of their spies.

4. To involve both parties, the Americans and the Shi'a, in a war that will result in both parties being losers.

5. Thus, the Americans will be forced to ask the Sunni for help.

6. To take advantage of some of the Shia elements that will allow the resistance to move among them.

7. To weaken the media's side which is presenting a tarnished image of the resistance, mainly conveyed by the Shi'a.

8. To enlarge the geographical area of the resistance movement.

9. To provide popular support and cooperation by the people.

The resistance fighters have learned from the result and the great benefits they reaped, when a struggle ensued between the Americans and the Army of Al-Mahdi. However, we have to notice that this trouble or this delegated war that must be ignited can be accomplished through:

1. A war between the Shi'a and the Americans.

2. A war between the Shi'a and the secular population (such as Ayad 'Alawi and al-Jalabi.)

3. A war between the Shi'a and the Kurds.

4. A war between Ahmad al-Halabi and his people and Ayad 'Alawi and his people.

5. A war between the group of al-Hakim and the group of al-Sadr.

6. A war between the Shi'a of Iraq and the Sunni of the Arab countries in the gulf.

7. A war between the Americans and Iraq. We have noticed that the best of these wars to be ignited is the one between the Americans and Iran, because it will have many benefits in favor of the Sunni and the resistance, such as:

1. Freeing the Sunni people in Iraq, who are (30 percent) of the population and under the Shi'a Rule.

2. Drowning the Americans in another war that will engage many of their forces.

3. The possibility of acquiring new weapons from the Iranian side, either after the fall of Iran or during the battles.

4. To entice Iran towards helping the resistance because of its need for its help.

5. Weakening the Shi'a supply line.

The question remains, how to draw the Americans into fighting a war against Iran? It is not known whether American is serious in its animosity towards Iraq, because of the big support Iran is offering to America in its war in Afghanistan and in Iraq. Hence, it is necessary first to exaggerate the Iranian danger and to convince America and the west in general, of the real danger coming from Iran, and this would be done by the following:

1. By disseminating threatening messages against American interests and the American people and attribute them to a Shi'a Iranian side.

2. By executing operations of kidnapping hostages and implicating the Shi'a Iranian side.

3. By advertising that Iran has chemical and nuclear weapons and is threatening the west with these weapons.

4. By executing exploding operations in the west and accusing Iran by planting Iranian Shi'a fingerprints and evidence.

5. By declaring the existence of a relationship between Iran and terrorist groups (as termed by the Americans).

6. By disseminating bogus messages about confessions showing that Iran is in possession of weapons of mass destruction or that there are attempts by the Iranian intelligence to undertake terrorist operations in America and the west and against western interests.

Let us hope for success and for God's help.

________________________________________________

End Text

4 Comments

Authenticate the letter first, then we can talk about the contents. I wouldn't trust anything coming from Rumsfeld's hands.

I notice that among the three of you you have a combined total of . . . fewer than fifteen years of military service.

Wow. Murtha's got nothing on you guys.

Dissension in the Ranks over Al-Qaida's New Chief in Iraq
By Evan Kohlmann

Since the death of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi on June 8, the U.S. military has been aggressively engaging the news media regarding the airstrike that killed Zarqawi and his potential successors as chief of Al-Qaida. Within days of Zarqawi's passing, the Pentagon focused its attention primarily on a little-known Egyptian mujahideen middleman known as Abu Ayyub al-Masri--who, for most of us, first surfaced in a CENTCOM most wanted list about a year and a half ago. When Al-Qaida subsequently announced that Zarqawi's actual successor would actually be another unknown named Abu Hamza al-Muhajir, the Pentagon revised their earlier statement and Major General William Caldwell explained to a press conference, "We think that Abu Ayyub al-Masri is in fact, probably, Abu Hamza al-Muhajir. They are probably one and the same."

Unfortunately, this conclusion has been called into serious doubt by a host of fairly credible sources. Many in the jihadist community that support Al-Qaida are openly scoffing at Major General Caldwell's latest press conference and they have called upon the Al-Qaida-umbrella group the Mujahideen Shura Council (MSC) to issue a new statement and clear up these "lies." I have also spoken with civilian analysts in the U.S. government responsible for tracking insurgents who expressed strong skepticism about the supposed "dual identity" of Abu Ayyub. They have even questioned details pertaining the photo distributed today in the media that purportedly depicts Abu Ayyub.

It is certainly possible that these press conferences are a deliberate ploy by the U.S. military to flush out Al-Qaida and force them to better identify their replacement leadership in the wake of Zarqawi's demise. But unless this is the specific and narrow purpose, the Pentagon should be especially careful that it does not engage in misleading speculation in the media--or it endangers losing significant credibility. With all due respect for the difficult task they have been handed, the military has already committed serious public relations blunders in reporting on progress made in fighting Zarqawi's movement, such as their past insistence on assigning meaningless numeric values to captured or killed Al-Qaida operatives. Let's hope this isn't yet another one...
June 15, 2006 04:48 PM

Dissension in the Ranks over Al-Qaida's New Chief in Iraq
By Evan Kohlmann

Since the death of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi on June 8, the U.S. military has been aggressively engaging the news media regarding the airstrike that killed Zarqawi and his potential successors as chief of Al-Qaida. Within days of Zarqawi's passing, the Pentagon focused its attention primarily on a little-known Egyptian mujahideen middleman known as Abu Ayyub al-Masri--who, for most of us, first surfaced in a CENTCOM most wanted list about a year and a half ago. When Al-Qaida subsequently announced that Zarqawi's actual successor would actually be another unknown named Abu Hamza al-Muhajir, the Pentagon revised their earlier statement and Major General William Caldwell explained to a press conference, "We think that Abu Ayyub al-Masri is in fact, probably, Abu Hamza al-Muhajir. They are probably one and the same."

Unfortunately, this conclusion has been called into serious doubt by a host of fairly credible sources. Many in the jihadist community that support Al-Qaida are openly scoffing at Major General Caldwell's latest press conference and they have called upon the Al-Qaida-umbrella group the Mujahideen Shura Council (MSC) to issue a new statement and clear up these "lies." I have also spoken with civilian analysts in the U.S. government responsible for tracking insurgents who expressed strong skepticism about the supposed "dual identity" of Abu Ayyub. They have even questioned details pertaining the photo distributed today in the media that purportedly depicts Abu Ayyub.

It is certainly possible that these press conferences are a deliberate ploy by the U.S. military to flush out Al-Qaida and force them to better identify their replacement leadership in the wake of Zarqawi's demise. But unless this is the specific and narrow purpose, the Pentagon should be especially careful that it does not engage in misleading speculation in the media--or it endangers losing significant credibility. With all due respect for the difficult task they have been handed, the military has already committed serious public relations blunders in reporting on progress made in fighting Zarqawi's movement, such as their past insistence on assigning meaningless numeric values to captured or killed Al-Qaida operatives. Let's hope this isn't yet another one...
June 15, 2006 04:48 PM

Varia, I consider your comment apalling. Obviously, there is "nothing" that will make you (and other Bush-haters) believe that there is a valid "militant muslim threat" to our democratic way of life in the West.