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September 30, 2006

Belgium Says Terror Monitoring System Illegal

Shortly after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the Belgium-based Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications, or SWIFT, reached an agreement with the United States Treasury Department, pursuant to U.S. subpoenas, to transfer information regarding financial transactions to the U.S. subject to certain limitations in order to protect the privacy of individuals. This made it easier for U.S. counterterrorism efforts to monitor the flow of money through terrorist networks without the knowledge of the suspected terrorists. This week the program was declared to be in violation of Belgian and European Union laws on privacy by the government-sponsored Commission for the Protection of Privacy. The Commission did not demand that the program end all activities immediately, but did demand that its operations be amended in order to be consistent with the Commission’s interpretation of the law (full text of 28-page decision in French, unofficial translation of three-page summary in English [PDF]).

Belgian Prime Minister Guy Verhofstadt was quoted by AP Brussels as saying that the EU would pursue “negotiations as quickly as possible over the question,” because the program would have to be changed. The existence of the program was secret until this past June when classified information about it was leaked to the New York Times. As reported in the Washington Post on Friday:

The decision, announced by Prime Minister Guy Verhofstadt, came as the country’s Data Privacy Commission released a 20-page [sic] report finding that the Belgium-based Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication, or SWIFT, had improperly turned over data from millions of global financial transactions to U.S. anti-terrorism investigators. “It has to be seen as a gross miscalculation by SWIFT that it has, for years, secretly and systematically transferred massive amounts of personal data for surveillance without effective and clear legal basis and independent controls in line with Belgian and European law,” the report says.

Leonard H. Schrank, SWIFT’s chief executive, said in a telephone interview that the cooperative “believes we complied with everything and respected to the fullest extent possible the privacy law in Belgium. But the trouble is data privacy laws in Europe are quite difficult to follow. They’re not drafted for national security issues.” SWIFT said in a statement that it had relinquished data to the U.S. Treasury Department only after it had been “subject to valid and compulsory subpoenas” from U.S. authorities…

The Post goes on to say that “Europeans tend to support strong efforts against terrorist groups… but many Europeans believe that U.S. policies go too far…” The initial premise of this statement is not accurate; as Lorenzo Vidino notes in Al-Qaeda in Europe, most European countries do not seriously punish or in some cases even prohibit acts which constitute logistical support for terrorism, only the terrorist acts themselves (p. 110).

According to the Belgian newspaper La Libre (“Vous etes en faute, surtout continuez”), Prime Minister Verhofstadt emphasized that “the commission did not ask us to stop the program.” A member of the parliament, Version Didier Reynders added, “the commission did not want to go that far, simply because it lacked the power” to shut down the system. The Commission report is quoted as requiring “supplementary guarantees.” One of the problems emphasized is that neither the Belgian government nor the European Union were notified of the existence of the program, although the Belgian National Bank was so notified.

La Libre also interviewed SWIFT CEO Leonard Schrank for a separate article (“Schrank: Plusiers attentats ont pu etre evites”). This is an excerpt (ThreatsWatch translation):

…The guarantees that we put in place in order to ensure that the information requested by Washington would not be used except for the fight against terrorism were extremely severe… this data would not be used to track financial fraud or for economic espionage… although the risk [of privacy violation] is close to zero, zero risk does not exist. One must minimize the risk without being able to eliminate it completely.

Bear in mind that this system has allowed us to save thousands of lives and perhaps more… It has been established that terrorist attacks, from both sides of the Atlantic, to the United States, to Canada and in Indonesia have been avoided thanks to the information provided by SWIFT…

What is left unclear now is whether the changes demanded by the Commission will undermine the program’s effectiveness. An examination of the brief summary of the decision and the full document suggests that changes to the program could well hinder its effectiveness in monitoring terrorists’ financial networks, or else Belgian and EU law will need to be changed. For example, section E.1.2 of the Commission’s opinion concerns the “Obligation to Inform” under a directive on privacy passed by the European parliament. The Commission interpreted the directive to require notice to all individuals who are customers of SWIFT-affiliated financial institutions, tipping off terrorists to the need for evading detection. Although publication of the existence of the program has already done some damage in this regard, enforcement of this rule could cause further damage because financial institutions do not have to process their transactions through SWIFT; despite the company’s centrality to this aspect of the world financial system, there are other means. If alternatives to SWIFT are within the EU, they would be subject to the same regulations.

That there does not appear to be significant political opposition to the SWIFT program may mean that any impeding regulation could be modified, nevertheless this decision introduces an element of uncertainty into the continued effectiveness of global efforts to monitor terrorist monetary transfers. Whether or not there are practical impediments to counterterrorist efforts will thus depend upon the nature of any modifications made on the monitoring system.

Baghdad Offensive Expands to Seven Areas

Operation Together Forward Phase II is a joint U.S.-Iraqi military offensive in Baghdad based upon a “clear, hold and build” strategy of sweeping one neighborhood at a time and then working on rebuilding government and commercial institutions in the area. Begun the second week of August, Phase II appears to have successfully cleared a half dozen Baghdad city sections, but both attacks on coalition forces and brutal killings of local civilians continue elsewhere in the city of 6.8 million. As we discussed in our September 11 report on Phase II, July was the bloodiest of the war for Iraqi civilians, especially in Baghdad, with August seeing about a 25-30 percent drop in violence in the capital city. While recent “death squad” killings have been deliberately provocative, with victims’ mutilated corpses left in the streets, the overall death rate may have been lower than August, although that is not certain. In addition to the sweep operations integral to Phase II, there have also been targeted raids on cells belonging to Sunni insurgents and the Mahdi Army of radical Shi’a cleric Muqtada al-Sadr.

Military press briefings, conducted by Major General James Thurman, Commander of MNF-Baghdad, and Major General William Caldwell, MNF-I spokesman, respectively, provide some update on Operation Together Forward (Pentagon Sept. 22 Briefing, MNF-I Sept. 27 Briefing). As indicated by the briefings, those areas of Baghdad in which clear and hold operations have been conducted have seen declines in violence, but some other areas have seen increases, possibly resulting in a slight decrease in violence for the first three weeks of September over August, although an aggregate picture is difficult to draw at this time. The Ameriya area of Baghdad has already been cleared as Phase II began. Ameriya is now in the build phase, and more recently Dura, Baya, Mansour, Kadhimiya and Adhamiya are the focus. Dura was identified by the Iraqi Baghdad security chief as the single worst area of the city over the summer, so if that area remains quiet it will be a very significant achievement. An examination of city maps indicates that these areas are in the south and west of Baghdad (two maps contained in the September 27 briefing linked above).

A September 14 release also reported that coalition forces had just begun clearing operations in the Baghdad neighborhood of Khadra. Meanwhile, the Washington Post reported that the Iraqi government had begun the process of building barriers around the city, using natural barriers where possible and otherwise restricting the flow of traffic into the city to monitorable routes.

Current foreign coalition and Iraqi forces in Baghdad were given as follows: 9,000 Iraqi soldiers, 12,000 national police (Interior Ministry forces), 22,000 local police, and 15,000 coalition forces. Maj. Gen. Thurman stated that he was requesting an additional 3,000 Iraqi soldiers from the Iraqi government to serve in Baghdad.

Maj. Gen. Thurman was asked directly about fighting with the Mahdi Army. He responded by saying that no specific organization was being targeted, but that coalition forces were taking down death squads whenever they were tipped off to them, and that likewise being a member of any organization would not protect someone deemed to be in a death squad. According to reporting by the international Arab newspaper Al-Hayat (Sept. 20, “Confrontations Between the Mahdi Army and American Forces”), there were multiple operations by coalition and Iraqi forces striking Mahdi Army members, whether the latter was being specifically targeted or not. The article reports that British forces killed Habib Jasim al-Abadi, a Mahdi Army leader, in Basra, and that multiple hits were made on Mahdi Army elements in Basra, Baghdad and Karbala. Sadrist representatives in the Iraqi parliament accused the U.S. of directly targeting the Mahdi Army in order to draw Sadrists into an open fight.

As noted above, there was significant violence in areas of Baghdad outside of current focus, and the second full week of the month saw the most gruesome effects. According to Al-Hayat (Sept. 17, “205 Corpses in a Week, Including 190 in the Capital Alone”), about 190 corpses were found in the streets in a week, usually with signs of torture. This included 60 corpses recovered on Wednesday the 13th, 50 corpses recovered on Thursday and Friday, and 47 bodies recovered on Saturday.

Al-Hayat, referring to that week as “Kill Week,” quoted Sadrists in the Iraqi parliament as blaming “Saddamist and takfiris [e.g. al-Qaeda],” while quoting Sunni members, as well as the Sunni Muslim Scholars Association, as blaming the same groups, but also blaming “political elements which are part of the government.” This statement could theoretically apply to either Sadr’s Mahdi Army or the Badr Brigades of SCIRI, the largest Shi’a faction, but the former is most likely. Sadr has openly called for calm and restraint by Shi’a in the face of Sunni attacks while Mahdi Army leaders claim that only rogue elements of their organization work in death squads. Yet the Sadrists have taken no visible steps to counter those kill squads which are operating out of neighborhoods they dominate, including Sadr City in Baghdad.

September 29, 2006

Taliban-al-Qaeda Alliance Defies Truce

In another open defiance of the truce deal signed between the Pakistani government and the Taliban-al-Qaeda alliance in North Waziristan, the Taliban have opened up an office near a Pakistani bus stop in the North Waziristan capital, Miran Shah. The location distributes fliers calling on Waziristan residents to contact the Taliban regarding “on all matters relating to law and order.” This is a blatant disregard for the truce agreement (as previously summarized based in part on reporting from Pakistan’s Daily Times).

mapnwfp-asiatimes.gifThis is not the first instance of disregard on the part of the Taliban-al-Qaeda alliance, as the tandem have made comfortable roost in the territory handed to them and vacated by Pakistani troops in early September. As questions surround the potential hand-over of yet more territory from the nuclear power to the Taliban and al-Qaeda within Pakistani borders, it will assuredly not be the last. It was reported earlier in Newsday that a US intelligence source had confirmed to reporters in Afghanistan and Pakistan that cross-border attacks by the Taliban-al-Qaeda alliance has tripled since the agreement, which on paper spelled out the end to attacks into Afghanistan on Afghan and Coalition troops.

Also today in North Waziristan, the Taliban claimed responsibility for the killing and public display of a man they claimed was a spy for Afghan intelligence. The man’s body was riddled with bullet holes and had a Taliban leaflet attached to his clothing entitled “Fate of the Spy.”

Even while President Bush praises Pakistani and Afghan accomplishments after their recent three-way meeting at the White House – with the atmosphere between Pakistani President Musharraf and Afghan President Hamid Karzai described as “extremely frosty” – al-Qaeda’s Waziristan territory remains outside the realm of Pakistani control and the North West Frontier Province appears in equal jeopardy of being ceded away. Pakistani madrassas continue to feed the Taliban and al-Qaeda with fresh recruits from within Pakistan proper, receiving open, public and dutiful praise from madrassa leaders. Questions remain also about the complicity of the Pakistani intelligence’s (ISI) level of complicity with and support for the Taliban-al-Qaeda alliance.

In the White House meeting, Afghan President Karzai accused Musharraf of not doing enough to fight the Taliban and Al-Qaeda and warned that cooperation with the Taliban and al-Qaeda is like “trying to train a snake against somebody else. You cannot train a snake. It will come and bite you.” Currently, the snake appears coiled around the remainder of Pakistan’s North West Frontier Province. From there, it could conceivably strike Islamabad, the capital of a nuclear power.

Iran Declares Security Council Ineffective

With two days of talks between Iran’s Ari Larijani and the EU’s Javier Solana ending Thursday with no progress, the Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki declared early Friday what has been whispered but rarely spoken aloud in Western diplomatic circles. Appearing on Iranian state-run television, Mottaki said, “There is no reason or logic to suspending nuclear activities. The foreigners have experienced that using the language of threats and referring (Iran) to the Security Council is ineffective and there is now no option but to hold talks.”

From other sources, some details of the two-day talks have emerged, most of them troubling. Frustrating those who have grown tired of ‘talks about talks’ under the guise of actual negotiations working toward a solution, the EU’s Solana said that “some important progress on the elements relating to how the potential negotiations can take place.”

Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad shed light on how any such negotiations can take place. He said of a halt to enrichment operations as reported back by Iran’s Ari Larijani, “Then they reached a point that they asked for even just a one-day halt. We said we won’t do it.” This presents itself as confirmation that Iran’s position remains that they seek the process of negotiations but will not compromise. The world appears resigned to accepting such conditions.

While the process subscribed to by the European Union through Javier Solana has been criticized widely as playing into the Iranian strategy of delay and division, even the United States Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice appeared ready to dismiss sanctions that would have the harshest impact on Iran: Sanctions against their import of gasoline, as the Iranians lack adequate indigenous refinery capacity to satisfy domestic demand. Rice cites fears of isolating the Iranian public from the West rather than from the mullah regime. This after the US Congress earlier this year reduced the amount of proposed funding in the Iran Freedom Support Act to support those same Iranian civilians from $75 million to merely $50 million.

For their part, the US House of Representatives approved an Iran sanctions bill Thursday, with the US Senate expected to follow. The current bill, formerly known as the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ISLA), is apparently the result of “intense consultations with the Bush administration” and bans groups and companies from participating in Iranian oil development as well as any industries and technologies that could lend direct or indirect assistance to Iran’s development of biological, chemical or nuclear weapons or “destabilizing numbers and types of advanced conventional weapons.” While the effort is to be applauded, the effect on the Iranian regime remains questionable.

The United States Treasury Department is also seeking to apply pressure to the Iranian regime by applying unilateral sanctions to international funds transfers for the state sponsor of terrorism and soliciting cooperation from other nations. The Treasury Department’s genuine attempts at doing what is within their power is doubted in its potential effectiveness. Says Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, Roger Leeds, speaking to the porous nature of the disparate international finance systems, “It’s so easy to transfer funds around the world without going through some of the major financial institutions. It can be a pain in the neck for the Iranians, it will make their life miserable, but it won’t keep them from transferring funds.”

While each effort is also to be applauded, they are collectively an example of an inconsistent patchwork of policy brought on by the lack of Western unity with regard to the Iranian nuclear crisis, saying nothing of the seemingly sidelined immediate crisis of terrorism sponsorship.

September 28, 2006

Clouds Forming For 'Autumn Rains' In Gaza

A confluence of events may be driving Israel closer to re-entering Gaza with overwhelming force, as several Israeli concerns remain either unresolved or growing in threat since Operation Summer Rains was launched after the Palestinian terrorist tunnel raid into Israel in June left two IDF soldiers dead and one, Cpl. Gilad Shalit, held captive.

One of the conditions contributing to Israeli frustration is that Shalit remains held captive by the Popular Resistance Committees terrorists, a group including current and former Hamas members. But of growing concern since last year’s handover of Gaza to Palestinian control remains massive weapons smuggling and stockpiling through Egypt. Yuval Diskin, head of Israel’s intelligence service Shin Bet, has has warned repeatedly of evidence of growing weapons stockpiles in the Gaza Strip. The latest estimate was stated to have grown to 19 tons of explosives alone, dispersed among many hidden caches and stores throughout Gaza. Iran and their proxy Hizballah have long been suspected of funneling weapons into Gaza, especially since the January election of Hamas into the majority of the Palestinian parliament.

Also a growing factor in Israeli motivations is the continued rocket assaults on Israeli towns near the Gaza border. At the local Israeli levels, residents and local leaders have been applying pressure to the government to bring an end to the rain of Qassam rockets that continues to plague them. They appear to question the sincerity of national leaders like Defense Minister Amir Peretz, who said yesterday, “Hamas knows that they will pay a heavy price with every Kassam fired at Israel and if they don’t stop them they know we will consider harsher and deeper operations into Gaza.” But perhaps adding meaning behind those words was the statement that followed, in which he said “There might be no other choice but to conquer the entire Gaza Strip to stop it from turning into a second Lebanon.”

Another concern that seemingly grows deeper daily is the growing animosity between PM Haniyeh’s Hamas and President Abbas’ Fatah as the drive to form a unity government continues to fail under the weight of Hamas’ refusal to recognize Israel’s right to exist. If the situation worsens between the two, fighting could commence once more in the streets of the Palestinian Territories – primarily in Gaza, where the explosives and weapons caches are believed to exist. Historically, when there has been internal fighting, one or more groups increases attacks on Israel in apparent attempts to position the particular group as true defenders of the Palestinians. With the increased weapons stores – including advanced anti-tank weapons such as those used in the June tunnel raid into Israel and also by Hizballah in Lebanon – this threat’s lethal potential is greater than ever.

At the same time however, Israeli Prime Minister and Mahmoud Abbas plan to meet for talks, former Israeli prime minister Shimon Peres urges Fatah and Hamas to settle their differences and form a unity government, and even the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) group is openly calling for Hamas to recognize Israel.

But Gilad Shalit remains held captive, the Gaza weapons caches continue to grow in both size and technology, and the rocket attacks into Israel from within Gaza continue.

September 27, 2006

Iranian Paradox: Negotiation Without Compromise

Thursday, Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad paradoxically said that Iran will negotiate but will not compromise regarding its nuclear program. “We are ready to hold negotiations for removing doubts and misunderstandings but no one is allowed to make a compromise on the people’s (nuclear) rights and ignore the laws (in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty),” he said.

ahmadinejad.jpgAhmadinejad rightly acknowledged that it is a matter of trust regarding Iran and nuclear technology, but refused to accept that as a principle for attempting to halt its program, saying, “Countries of the world will not accept a monopoly by certain powers of nuclear weapons while others are refused access to the nuclear fuel cycle simply because they cannot be trusted and could use this for non-peaceful purposes.”

Within the same speech, where Ahmadinejad also declared the “age of empires and emperors” over, he invited “bullying powers and dictators of the world to monotheism and justice. We urge bullying powers to end their crimes, cruelty and aggression.” Iran and others – such as al-Qaeda – seek to establish a global caliphate that would enforce ‘monotheism,’ governed by a single caliph.

Ahmadinejad appears to be making the rounds at home, delivering speeches on the heels of his trip to the West, which included an incendiary address to the United Nations General Assembly. The state-run Iranian media outlets lauded his messages which are reported as being well received at home in Iran.

Regardless of past negotiations failures, Javier Solana’s talks with Ali Larijani have caused pause in Washington’s press for sanctions against Iran for ignoring the August 31 Security Council deadline for ceasing enrichment activity. Of the EU-Iran negotiations that Ahmadinejad said will not include compromise, State Department spokesman Sean McCormack said, “There may be an opportunity here, there may be a little opening if we just give the Iranians a little time and space. Perhaps they will come through with a positive answer.”

While Ahmadinejad was stating Iran’s stance on negotiating without compromising, the head of Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization and Iranian vice-president, Reza Aqazadeh, also made it clear that negotiations will not include any discussion of the Bushehr power plant currently under Russian construction. Aqazadeh added that, with regard to the Bushehr plant, “Russia will support Iran.” Russia is contracted to complete the Bushehr construction for approximately US$1 billion.

Iraqis Reach Temporary Compromise on Federalism

Iraq’s Shi’a, Sunni and Kurdish parties agreed on the formation of a committee to propose constitutional changes as a prerequisite to the establishment of a system of federal governance by region. As we discussed in a recent report (“Federalism Delayed Amid Sunni, Sadrist Opposition”), Sunni opponents of the autonomy plan argue that Article 142 of the Iraqi constitution provides that amendments to the constitution must be considered prior to the establishment of autonomous regions. The leader of the largest Sunni bloc as already declared that the committee’s proposals are nonbinding, and that he would not accept an autonomy plan that might endanger Iraq’s unity. Arguments also broke out between Sunni and Kurdish parliamentarians. Separately, British forces killed an important al-Qaeda leader in Basra, while local governments stepped up security measures in advance of Ramadan.

As reported in the Iraqi newspaper Al-Rafidayn, all major Iraqi factions agreed on the formation of a 24-member committee to study changes to the constitution and make proposals, especially as related to the issue of establishing a federal system of government. Of the 24, 12 were to come from the dominant Shi’a coalition, the ruling United Iraqi Alliance, five were to come from the Kurdish Coalition, and four from the Iraqi Accord Front, the largest Sunni coalition, with one member each coming from smaller parties which supported the proposal. Only the Iraqi National Dialogue Front, a Sunni party, refused to participate, and withdrew from parliament during the discussion. The NDF holds only four percent of the parliament’s seats, so its withdrawal does not itself undermine the process.

It is questionable how final the resulting proposals would be, as Adnan Dulaimi, the leader of the Iraqi Accord Front, was quoted in Al-Hayat as stating flatly that any proposals coming out of the committee were not binding on those parties, such as his, which had agreed to, and participated in, its establishment. Furthermore, the chairman of Regions Committee, Zafir al-Ani, also a member of Dulaimi’s Accord Front, resigned in protest, saying that he thought that the effort would lead to the division of Iraq and that he would not be associated with it. The agreement on a constitutional committee seems to have been accepted by many as a way to put the issue off rather than resolve it. Al-Hayat did quote Ani as saying that the Accord Front would “get into the details” of any proposal to make sure that it was not a threat to the country’s unity, suggesting a possible opening to compromise if the proposal were to be set properly. For his part, Abd al-Karim al-Anzi, a member of the Shi’a UIA, said that participating in the committee obligated a party to not withdraw from parliament over the issue and accept the final vote, although of course each party was free to vote against it.

Aside from the debate between the largest Shi’a and Sunni parties over the desirability of the federal autonomy plan, the most heated element in the debate was a charge by a member of Iyad Allawi’s National Iraqi List, Usama al-Najaifi, that Kurdish militias were engaging in ethnic cleansing in Mosul, attempting to change the demographics of the city, which is the capital of the Ninawa Province in northern Iraq. Kurdish members rejected the charge and demanded an apology, and the List’s parliamentary leader, Hamid Najid Musa, apologized saying that the Najaifi did not represent the party, and that the accusations were wrong.

There was a separate flare up, reported in Al-Hayat, which arose when Muhammad al-Dayni, leader of the National Dialogue Front, argued against the federalism plan by saying that the Kurdish provincial constitution made no mention of Iraq whatsoever. But Fu’ad Masum, a Kurdish parliamentarian, argued that the document to which Dayni referred was a draft of the provincial constitution which was being revised. Masum stated that the Kurdish constitution would recognize the federal Iraqi constitution as supreme.

In other news from the south of Iraq, British troops killed Umar al-Faruq, an al-Qaeda leader for southeast Asia, in a predawn raid on Monday. Aside from Faruq’a own operational importance, the killing was significant because Faruq had been previously captured and had then escaped from a coalition-run prison in Afghanistan last year.

Also from southern Iraq, Al-Rafidayn reports on special security arrangements taken by Iraqi police in the Province of Maysan in southeast Iraq. The article reports that the plan involves an increase in police patrols, extra security for high-rise buildings and areas in which families would congregate, and strengthening of checkpoints. During the Shi’a religious festival of Musa in August, commemorations went mostly well but at one location enemy snipers were able to kill 20 pilgrims, so security services will be watching for that threat. Ramadan is a Muslim holy month involving daily fasting and festive gatherings by night.

Updates on security-related developments in Baghdad and elsewhere in central Iraq are to come.

Gaza Tunnels And Hamas’ Determination

Palestinian security forces have discovered yet more tunnels beneath the Gaza-Egypt border, sheltered by structures on either side for concealment. While it is unclear which specific wing of the disparate ‘Palestinian security forces’ was responsible for the find, recent animosities between the Fatah and Hamas factions within the Palestinian territories may provide a clue.

idf-tunnel-find.jpgGaza is dominated on the ground by Hamas while much of the Palestinian Authority security forces remain loyal to their rival Fatah’s Mahmoud Abbas, the Palestinian president. In recent days, Hamas’ reaffirmed refusal to recognize Israel and pre-existing agreements between Yassir Arafat’s PLO and the Jewish state has quelled the optimism once held for a Palestinian Unity government. Within the context of word that Abbas planned to confront Hamas in Gaza this week and issue an ultimatum regarding recognizing and negotiating with Israel, tensions between the two factions are relatively high and may serve to exacerbate the situation.

Hamas spokesman Ghazi Hamad said that a meeting between Abbas and Hamas’ PA Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh was cancelled due to “disagreements and difficulties” without elaborating. He added that “We will overcome the problems. We haven’t hit a dead end.” But dead end or not, the distance between the two groups’ approaches is vast and no less polarizing than in American politics.

Further exemplifying the chasm between Hamas and Fatah, VOA News charcterized the position of Hamas’ PA Foreign Minister Mahmoud al-Zahar as believing that “it is useless to appease the West and recognize Israel since there has been no benefit from doing so in the past.”

While Hamas and Fatah battle for leadership within Gaza and the West Bank, the pressure is on Hamas from all sides as Israel has decided to keep captured Hamas legislators in jail until their legal proceedings have run their course, reversing an earlier decision to release them beforehand.

September 26, 2006

Russia Supports Iranian Program As US Flounders

While Russia holds much power in the UN Security Council proceedings concerning Iran’s nuclear program and Western fears of a weapons program, Russia continues to display its closer relationship with its cash customer Islamic Republic than the West. Iran and Russia have agreed to launch the Bushehr nuclear plant in November 2007, a plant built by Russia under a lucrative construction contract. Also included in that contract is the initial supply of nuclear fuel until Iran can produce enough of their own indigenously to support it. Russia is not only building Iran’s nuclear facilities and supplying them the nuclear fuel beginning in March – despite Iranian claims of its own abilities and intent – but Russia is also selling the regime advanced anti-aircraft missile systems to protect their various nuclear facilities from any attack by Western powers. The deep Iranian-Russian economic ties are further exemplified today by the sale of five Russian Tu-204-100 passenger airliners.

But that is only part of what appears to be a losing battle with the steadfast Iranian regime over its nuclear ambitions. The state-sponsor of terrorism is reaping the benefits that come with the West’s own divide, a forming gulf more and more evident between Europe and America.

While Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert expresses confidence that President Bush is ‘absolutely determined to prevent’ a nuclear armed Iran and that Israel and America would together prevent such an outcome, few nations appear to share Israel’s determination, perhaps including the America he praises for its stalwartness.

The European Union’s Javier Solana, among others, continues talks with Iran after the regime ignored the UN Security Council mandate that it halt enrichment activities at the end of August. His office claims to be close to a deal with Iran on the nuclear issue in secretive talks between Solana and Iranian chief negotiator Ali Larijani, himself a former Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps commander who still holds leadership sway within the IRGC that founded Hizballah in Lebanon.

What the EU-Iranian deal entails is shrouded in mystery, but many would presume that it include a cessation of enrichment activities. But according to the vice president of the Iranian National Atomic Energy Organization, Mohammad Saeedi, any potentially pending deal will not include a cessation of enrichment. In response to reports of the two sides nearing agreement, Saeedi said in Tehran, “The imposition of a three-month moratorium on [uranium] enrichment activities will not be discussed during the upcoming talks between Larijani and Solana.”

In a meeting between Australian and Iranian ambassadors to Iraq, Iranian state-controlled news reports that the Australian ambassador referred to Iran’s current role in Iraqi affairs as “constructive and positive.” The meeting between the two took place at the Iranian embassy in Baghdad.

Even the American position exhibits signs of moderation and weakening, as Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice asserted that she does not think a gasoline embargo on Iran should be considered as part of any potential sanctions. She said, “You want to stay away from things that have a bad effect on the Iranian people to the degree that you can. That’s something we really do have to fight against and some believe a gasoline embargo might play into that.” While her concerns are seen by most as not without some merit, the only sanctions against the regime that appear on the table revolve around freezing certain assets and the pulling of visas and limiting the regime’s travel abroad – a move that may have pleased many Americans had it been imposed before Ahmadinejad’s performance at the UN General Assembly and former Iranian president Khattami’s cross-country US speaking tour.

So while the Israeli Prime Minister, Ehud Olmert, speaks of confidence that America and Israel will not allow a nuclear-armed Iran, there appear few options the US administration is willing to support in order to qualify for such praise and confidence amid dissolving resolve.

The question on the minds of many is: Is there an emerging ‘Persian Gulf’ between the US and Europe, or is America experiencing a dissolving resolve and actually drifting closer to European acquiescence?

September 24, 2006

Hizballah: Public Celebration, Private Concern

As troops from the Lebanese Army finally make their way to the Israeli border in keeping with UNSC Resolution 1701, Hizballah leader Hassan Nasrallah held a massive Beirut rally Friday in celebration of what Hizballah calls its “divine victory” over Israel in the 34-day conflict spanning July and August. In Nasrallah’s speech to a crowd estimated at over 800,000 people, he declared that “No army in the world will be able to make us drop the weapons from our hands.”

Thumbing his nose at Resolution 1701, which calls for Hizballah to be disarmed, he proclaimed that Hizballah still has over 20,000 rockets. “I say to all those who want to close the seas, skies and the deserts and the border and the enemy, the resistance today possesses more — I underline that — more than 20,000 rockets,” he said.

But Israeli Foreign Ministry spokesman Mark Regev offered that this supposed number is even greater than the number Hizballah claimed before the conflict began. Regardless, Regev deadpanned, under the UN Security Council resolution Hizballah “shouldn’t have any rockets.”

The following day in Harissa 17 miles north of Beirut, the leader of the Christian Lebanese Forces held a rally against Hizballah with tens of thousands of supporters on hand. Leader Samir Geagea told supporters in response to Hizballah’s victory rally, “I don’t feel victory because the majority of the Lebanese people do not feel victory. Rather, they feel that a major catastrophe had befallen them and made their present and future uncertain.” Geagea was pardoned by the Lebanese parliament and released from prison in July 2005 after serving 11 years of 3 life sentences for murder convictions, including the murder of pro-Syrian Prime Minister Rashid Karami.

Geagea went on to demand Hizballah’s disarmament for sake of Lebanon’s sovereignty, saying, “When we find a solution to (the issue of Hizballah’s) weapons, then it will be possible to establish the state as it should be.” He criticized Hizballah’s creation of a “state within a state” and the Lebanese government for allowing it. Yet, while Nasrallah called for the disbanding of the Lebanese government and the formation of a new one, Geagea defended the Saniora government on the grounds that at least it was finally a Lebanese government and not a Syrian sideshow.

While publicly Hizballah and Nasrallah are holding rallies and declaring victory, a much less celebratory picture emerges in one-on-one interviews with Hizballah’s leaders. Hizballah’s political leader, Nasrallah, is said to be privately very depressed about the state of affairs after the Israeli war. As Ehud Yaari describes for the Washington Institute, “Hassan Nasrallah is showing clear signs of “dejection, melancholy and depression,” according to the editors of the Lebanese daily al-Safir, who are counted among the most steadfast supporters of the leader of Hizballah.”

Hizballah deputy-secretary, Sheikh Naim Qassem, said that after the war, Hizballah needs time to reconsider the nature and state of their activities. No longer does the terrorist organization have unfettered access to hardened positions along the Israeli border and they must also now keep their weapons concealed, a negotiated alternative to being disarmed in the south of Lebanon. But much of Hizballah’s firepower is being moved north into a consolidated Bekaa Valley position occupying the region along the Syrian border.

Adding to Lebanon’s internal challenges, al-Qaeda seeks a foothold in Lebanon, as noted by US Director of National Intelligence John Negroponte. Al-Qaeda #2 Ayman al-Zawahiri called for the establishment of a foothold in Lebanon in his latest statements, saying “I call on every sincere Muslim who is able to reach south Lebanon to rush to defeat the Zionist forces invading Lebanon … to strive with everything at our disposal to set up a jihad base on the borders of Palestine.” While Negroponte expressed uncertainty over al-Qaeda’s success thus far, he noted the intent as well as evidence of al-Qaeda activity inside Lebanon.

As noted by Emily Hunt and Olivier Guitta, much of al-Qaeda’s observed activity in Lebanon has been in the Sunni-majority northern parts of Lebanon, including Tripoli.

September 23, 2006

Hamas Sends Unity Gov't 'Back to Zero'

After Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas said at the United Nations that a Palestinian ‘Unity Government’ to be forged between Hamas and Fatah would recognize both Israel and existing agreements between the Jewish state and the PLO, Hamas was quick to correct Abbas and declared that it absolutely would not recognize Israel. This embarrassment has caused Mahmoud Abbas to declare that any prospect of a ‘Unity Government’ was “back to zero.”

But Israeli Defense Minister Amir Peretz said Saturday that any such ‘Unity Government’ is unnecessary to begin peace talks between the Palestinian Authority and Israel. He asserted that it is not a matter of government organization or formation, but rather simply the recognition of the state of Israel by the terrorist group Hamas. Said Peretz, “What difference does it make what the government is called? If Hamas were to recognize Israel’s right to exist, I would recommend direct talks with Hamas.”

This precondition appears untenable as Hamas’ PA Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh declared bluntly Friday that he would not serve at the head of any government that recognizes Israel. Haniyeh declared at mosque services, “The government and the Hamas movement will be against recognizing Israel. Our position to solve the crisis is a 10-year truce which will be good for stability and prosperity.” The call for a 10-year truce (hudna) dates back to the day Hamas claimed their electoral victory as the majority within the Palestinian parliament.

Elsewhere, Israel has allowed the opening of the Rafah crossing on the Gaza border with Egypt ahead of the Islamic holy month of Ramadan. How long it will remain open is unclear and appears to be a day-to-day decision.

While the Rafah crossing was opened to the transit of people and goods, the Israeli Air Force carried out a double airstrike on a Gaza home along the Egyptian border. The home was owned by a suspected weapons dealer, which was used as an entry/exit point for tunnels into Egypt dug beneath the border.

Catholic churches continue to be attacked in both the West Bank and Gaza, as attacks with assault rifles, small pipe bombs and Molotov cocktails are becoming commonplace. In Nablus, Palestinian police who stood guard outside a Roman Catholic church fended off one attack, as heavy machinegun fire was reported after midnight.

Elsewhere along the Gaza and West Bank borders with Israel, the IDF has closed all crossings since Friday after unspecified intelligence of terrorist threats during the Jewish Rosh Hashanah (Jewish New Year) holiday. The Israeli border closures are expected to last until the end of Sunday.

September 22, 2006

Ahmadinejad Proclaims ‘No Need’ For Nukes

While the UN General Assembly continued at the UN with a third day of speeches from various world leaders, Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad continued his bellicose string of appearances in New York at a UN press conference and a speaking engagement by invitation at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR).

At the UN press conference, Ahmadinejad offered the notion that Iran does not seek nuclear weapons if for no other reason than Iran does not need such an outdated weapon. He told reporters, “The bottom line is, we don’t need a bomb. Unlike what others think. Regretfully, some believe that the nuclear bomb can be effective in international relations. They’re wrong, because the time for nuclear bombs has ended.” Having stated often that archenemy Israel should be “wiped off the map,” the Iranian president did not offer to explain why Israel’s presumed possession of nuclear weapons is therefore a constant cause for Iranian concern. Israel’s possession of nuclear weapons has been used by others – including openly by some in Iran - as justification for Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons.

Ahmadinejad’s claim yesterday was quickly followed up today by a statement from Iranian First (of 10) Vice President Parziv Davoudi that Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Khameini, has stated that Iran is forbidden from using nuclear weapons. This is not to be confused as a new declaration or fatwa from the mullah leader. Khameini issued the declaration some time ago.

mesbahyazdi.gifHowever, Khameini’s fatwa was contradicted by a fatwa from the extremely radical Hojjetiah sect leader - and Ahmadinejad mentor - Ayatollah Mohammad Taghi Mesbah-Yazdi, whom the UK’s Telegraph called “a hardliner to terrify hardliners.” In February 2006, shortly after Ahmadinejad’s election as president, Ayatollah Yazdi pronounced that it is “only natural” for Iran to have nuclear weapons as a “countermeasure” against its enemies who possess them (Israel and the United States). A spokesman for Ayatollah Yazdi, Mohsen Gharavian, elaborated at the time that “for the first time that the use of nuclear weapons may not constitute a problem, according to Sharia. When the entire world is armed with nuclear weapons, it is permissible to use these weapons as a counter-measure. According to Sharia too, only the goal is important.”

The secretive Hojjetiah sect in Iran has seen a manifold increase in its power and influence since Ahmadinejad’s election, including a purge of the Iranian diplomatic corps and the insertion of current and former Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps leaders into leadership posts throughout government. It was this IRGC which founded and currently provides operational and material support for Lebanon’s Hizballah terrorist organization.

Anbar Sunnis Turn on al-Qaeda

Twenty-five Sunni tribes in Iraq’s western Anbar Province say that they have sealed an agreement to unite against al-Qaeda because of the foreign terrorist group’s indiscriminate killing of innocent Iraqis. This is actually the formalization of a process which has been ongoing for more than a year, as native Sunni Iraqis who opposed the presence of U.S. troops came to view foreign jihadists not as the allies they claimed to be, but as enemies of the Iraqi people. The Sunni and Shi’a factions which had once found common cause have now entirely turned on each other. This has coincided with progress in the reconciliation process, although Iraqi troops, now in the lead in the north central provinces of Iraq, face major challenges as terrorist attacks in Kirkuk and Tel Afar challenged their authority.

As reported in the New York Times:

More than two-dozen tribes from Iraq’s volatile Sunni Arab-dominated province west of Baghdad have agreed to join forces and fight Al Qaeda insurgents and other foreign-backed “terrorists,” an influential tribal leader said today. Twenty-five of about 31 tribes in Anbar Province, a vast, mostly desert region that stretches westward from Baghdad to the borders of Syria, Jordan and Saudi Arabia, have agreed to fight together against insurgents and gangs that are “killing people for no reason,” said the tribal leader, Sheik Abdul Sattar Buzaigh Al-Rishawi.

“We held a meeting earlier and agreed to fight those who call themselves mujahedeen,” Mr. Rishawi said in an interview today. “We believe that there is a conspiracy against our Iraqi people. Those terrorists claimed that they are fighters working on liberating Iraq, but they turned out to be killers. Now all the people are fed up and have turned against them.”

This marks the end of a broad anti-American coalition which came together in the two years following the fall of the Baathist regime in April 2003, but began to show increasing signs of strain in the latter part of 2005. This coalition was destined to come apart, as its four constituent elements had mutually exclusive goals - the foreign jihadists, led by al-Qaeda, sought to establish a globally-focused caliphate based in Baghdad which excluded the Shi’a; Sunni Islamist Iraqis sought an Islamic state under their control; secularist Baathist Iraqis sought the reestablishment of the regime of Saddam Hussein; and the Shi’a militia of Muqtada al-Sadr, the Mahdi Army, sought a Shi’a-led Islamic state in Iraq. This was never a real alliance, as they had little in common except hatred of the U.S. While Sadr made inroads with Sunni insurgents during 2005, attacks on Sunni civilians by his militia soured relations. At the same time, complaints by Sunni Iraqis against al-Qaeda have been heard for months, but this is the first time that a formal agreement to fight al-Qaeda has been reached by Sunni tribes. (See our August 5 report, which discusses both issues.)

This splintering of the insurgency has fed directly into increased support for Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki’s reconciliation and amnesty plan, based on a series of conferences and working groups in which Sunni and Shi’a religious, tribal and community leaders meet to discuss issues. On July 17, the Iraqi newspaper Al-Sabah reported that a tribal conference in Karbala resulted in “more than 300” tribal leaders signing a document foreswearing the shedding of Iraqi blood, and committing themselves to the peaceful resolution of conflict. A separate agreement between the Shi’a and Sunni Waqf administrations was reported by the Iraqi newspaper Al-Rafidayn on September 14, committing themselves to doing everything possible to keep the holy month of Ramadan safe for all Iraqis. The same article noted an agreement involving 20 Sunni insurgent factions which committed to a variety of points, including a prohibition on shedding Iraqi blood, a prohibition on attacking Iraqi infrastructure, and a commitment to help rebuild infrastructure in Sunni areas.

One ongoing issue of contention has been the continued call by many Sunnis for the release of Saddam Hussein. Not only is there no chance that the government will agree to this, but the mere fact that many tribal leaders keep repeating the demand undermines the credibility of their claims that they want to stop fighting. In the words of the Shi’a Karbala News Agency, “Analysts view the demand from Sunni tribes of releasing the dictator Saddam as making clear that they are behind all that which takes place in terms of destruction and the killing of innocents among Iraqis, and that they seek to undermine the democratic process and return to the rule of the minority over the majority…” Not all Sunni Arabs demand Saddam’s release, as recently reported in Al-Hayat (“Tribes Reject Call for the Release of Saddam”). The article notes a widely reported call for Saddam’s release by Shaikh Wasfi al-Asi of the large Abid tribe, but reports that other Sunni Arab tribal leaders differ. It quotes Shaikh Abd al-Ali al-Attiya, a tribal leader in Kirkuk, as saying that “we were surprised… we would like for tribal leaders to look again at the issue of the arrest of Saddam and his release. For Iraqis live in a difficult time and they seek to move beyond the images of the former regime and its dreams.”

As we discussed in a recent report (“ISF Steps Up in Sunni Arab North”), U.S. troop levels in north central Iraq have declined and Iraqi troops have largely although not entirely taken over responsibility for security. Yet the government’s opponents are determined not to allow this to happen peaceably. On Sunday, a series of terrorist attacks in Kirkuk targeting Iraqi police killed 26 and wounded 85. One of the bombs hit a police headqaurters, and two others targeted patrols (Reuters, Washington Post). There was also a major terrorist attack in Tel Afar, in the Ninawa Province in northwest Iraq, which killed 20 and wounded 17 (Washington Post). Ninawa is a mixed Sunni Arab/Kurdish province in which has seen both major insurgent activity and coalition operations.

September 21, 2006

IDF Not Ready For Weekend Pullout

While it was originally reported that Israel would pull its last forces out of Lebanon by the weekend, the coordination between the IDF and the international forces in place has hit a snag, causing a delay. The IDF’s General Dan Halutz had said Tuesday, “If all goes without a hitch, to the satisfaction of all sides, the working assumption is the IDF will leave all the areas it controls by the Jewish New Year holiday. If not, it would be delayed another week.” Enter the hitch as the Seattle Times reports that “final details remained to be worked out” between the IDF and the UN-sanctioned international force now at 5,000 troops.

But perhaps there is another cause, as Hizballah has planned a ‘Victory rally’ Friday in Beirut. Breitbart notes that “Villagers gathered in the southern port town of Tyre for a 80-kilometre (50-mile) march to Beirut donned the yellow T-shirts of Hezbollah and caps marked ‘Nasrallah, we respond to your call.’” Whether or not Hassan Nasrallah will make his first public appearance since the July 12 abduction of two IDF soldiers remains unclear.

Meanwhile, eight German navy vessels have set sail to join the international forces in Lebanon. This deployment is the largest naval deployment by Germany since World War II.

Even with both Israeli and international troops present, Hizballah still enjoys unbridled support from state sponsors Iran and Syria. Responding to President Bush’s statement condemning Iranian support for terrorism - including its creation of Hizballah in Lebanon - and Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons, Ahmadinejad said to CNN, “This is not the kind of language you speak talking with a great nation. It is an insult to a great nation.” Ahmadinejad did not reference Hugo Chavez’s much-criticized tirade at the UN in support of Iran regarding “the kind of language you speak.”

As for Syria, ruler Bashar Assad said that war with Israel is a possibility because Israel is “looking for a way out of the crisis it is in through a new [military] operation,” offering further that Israel would use Syrian aid to Iran as a justification. Assad concluded that “Syria will resist, stand strong and never give in.” Syria’s hollow military forces, however, are said to likely buckle with much alacrity as Syria sinks into insurgency with any outbreak of war with Israel. An insurgency would be the immediate end to the days of the Assads’ rule.

To Israel’s south, Hamas praised a statement by the Quartet which supported the formation of a unity government in the Palestinian Territories. Arutz Sheva quotes Hamas spokesman Sami Abu Zuhri as saying, “The decision by the Quartet… is a progressive position, and we hope that this position will contribute to stopping all forms of political and economic siege.” The same article also quotes Hamas’ PA Prime Minister Haniyeh as calling it a sign of “political flexibility and understanding.”

Yet, the primary source of disagreement between the Fatah and Hamas elected factions is Hamas’ own inflexibility and refusal to recognize pre-existing agreements with Israel, let alone recognizing Israel as a state at all. Through the negotiations in the Palestinian Territories and elsewhere, Hamas’ founding charter remains unaltered, still calling openly for the destruction of Israel.

September 19, 2006

EU, IAEA: Reset Iran’s Nuclear Stopwatch

As the UN General Assembly gets under way this week, new signs of the successful Iranian separation of European allies from the United States regarding the Iranian nuclear crisis are clear, as cracks in any unity are exploited to their fullest. Not unexpectedly, IAEA director Mohammed ElBaradei voiced strong support for the European hints at scrapping the UN Security Council resolution and its calls for sanctions. Iran refused to abide by the UNSC demands of ceasing enrichment operations by August 31, a deadline that has passed without action or consequence.

Once again frustrating those who believe Iran is conducting nuclear research in pursuit of nuclear weapons, IAEA head Mohammed ElBaradei has called for a return to square one with Iran, stating that negotiation with Iran is ‘long overdue’. Seemingly dismissing Iranian intransigence since the IAEA became directly involved in the investigation into the Iranian nuclear program, ElBaradei expressed hope that “conditions will be created to engage in a long overdue negotiation that aims to achieve a comprehensive settlement” between “Iran and its European and other partners.” Talks between Iran and various representatives of ‘its European’ partners have occurred at various times since the IAEA began to develop its current Iranian dossier in 2003.

French President Jacques Chirac suggested that there be no sanctions on Iran, regardless of the UN Security Council resolution that included French support. Seemingly handing Iran a chronological victory, Chirac suggested that the Security Council resolution be scrapped and both sides return to square one. Said Chirac, “We must, on the one hand, together, Iran and the six countries, meet and set an agenda for negotiations then start negotiations. Then, during these negotiations I suggest that the six renounce seizing the UN Security Council and Iran renounces uranium enrichment.” Precisely what Mr. Chirac meant by ‘seizing’ the UN Security Council remains open to vague interpretation, but what is clear is yet another example of European distancing from America at the hands of Iran’s wedge formation.

Seemingly remiss to acknowledge the broad shift away from the UNSC resolution, US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said that she believes Russia and China will support sanctions on Iran, as called for by the resolution. Said Secretary Rice, “We had a deal, and the deal was the following, and Iran understood that: If Iran was prepared to suspend its uranium enrichment and negotiate we were prepared to go down that road. And the United States prepared to go to the table for the first time in more than two decades. If Iran did not, then the Security Council would have to act.” But there are no indications that anyone in the Security Council intends to move forward with sanctions except for the United States. Russia and China remain opposed to sanctions, having yet to assert their implementation.

While acknowledging that she hopes the sporadic Iranian talks with the EU’s Javier Solana will end with an Iranian agreement to halt its enrichment program, she noted that the Security Council resolution remains in place and that both the UN and the Security Council faces a ‘credibility issue’ if sanctions are not sought against Iran as a consequence for thumbing their nose at the UNSC demands.

As his date on the world stage at the UN General Assembly approaches, Iranian President Ahmadinejad declared that he and Iran have ‘clear ideas’ for better management of global affairs, criticizing the UN for not taking action with affairs other than Iran’s nuclear crisis. Said Ahmadinejad, the “Iran (nuclear) issue is not that important as to deserve so much hype.”

It is, however, important enough for Iran to re-assign its Deputy Foreign Minister for Economic Affairs, Alireza Sheikh-Attar, to become the Iranian ambassador to Brussels, the home of the European Union’s headquarters and leadership which appears eager to return to square one with Iran, turning back the Iranian nuclear stopwatch three years.

Federalism Delayed Amid Sunni, Sadrist Opposition

Iraq’s most contentious domestic political issue, a controversial plan to create an autonomous region for the Shi’a in the south and for Baghdad similar to that currently in existence in the Kurdish north, came to head this past week, and was then postponed. Yet the course of the debate put the spotlight on divisions within the ruling United Iraqi Alliance (UIA) as well as more well-known divisions between the Shi’a and the Kurds, who support autonomy, and the Sunnis, who do not. Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki also visited Iran, where he discussed closing the Iraq-Iran border, implementing previously-signed commercial agreements, discussed new ones, and attempted to mediate the conflict between Iran and the United States. There were further indications that the contentious issue of the design of the Iraqi flag, which divides Arabs from Kurds, might be resolved soon.

The tenor of political discussion in Iraq currently was shown in an article published in Al-Hayat Sunday, Mosque Sermons Focus on Federalism and Prosecuting Saddam. The article notes that the three most prominent issues discussed in Shi’a mosques were the federalism issue, the prime minister’s visit to Iran, and the importance of bringing Saddam Hussein to justice for his crimes against the Iraqi people. It specifically notes that Shaikh Sadr al-Din al-Qubanji emphasized the importance of Maliki’s Iran visit and the role that Iraq could play in mediating between Iran and the United States. The article states that “at the same time Sunni mosques focused on attacking statements made by the Pope, considering them hostile to Islam and to Muslims.”

Certainly the most contentious and complex political issue now is the provincial autonomy or federalism plan which was included in the constitution approved last year and which is primarily sponsored by the most powerful Shi’a faction, the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), along with the Kurdish factions. Because the bulk of Iraq’s oil wealth is in the south and north-central parts of the country, Sunnis fear that the Shi’a and Kurds will use autonomous provinces to dominate the oil industry and leave them behind (for other English sources, see the Washington Post and Reuters).

According to Arab media reports (Al-Rafidayn, Al-Hayat), the three Sunni parties - the Iraqi Accord, headed by Adnan Dulaimi, the Iraqi National List, headed by Iyad Allawi, and the National Dialogue Party, headed by Salih Mutlak - all opposed the bill strongly. Both Dulaimi and Mutlak threatened to pull their parties from parliament if it were passed in its original form, which granted wide powers to the proposed autonomous regions. Al-Rafidayn notes that on September 10 the parliament decided to send the bill back to committee, to be discussed again in the middle of this week.

Interestingly, Al-Hayat reports that the opposing parties have sought a legal remedy, and have asked the Iraqi Supreme Court to declare that article 142 of the constitution, which bears on the amendment to the constitution, be interpreted to require that amendments be considered before other constitutional matters, including Article 118, which stipulates that the parliament shall set for the procedures to govern the formation of federal regions. The argument of precedence is based on the fact that 142 has a shorter time for completion than 118 ([PDF] full text of the Iraqi constitution in English). Moreover, the Accord Front, which is the strongest Sunni party, suggested that it might accept federalism if sufficient amendments were made to the bill regarding the powers of the regions, and the Kurdish Coalition indicated that it was willing to agree to Sunni demands that constitutional reforms precede final voting on the autonomy issue, while nevertheless noting that approval of their autonomy was a “red line” for the Kurds. The leadership of the UIA, meanwhile, stressed that the creation of the federal regions was a constitutional obligation, but that they did not wish to paralyze parliament and agreed to the postponement.

Separately, Al-Hayat reported that the Sadrist faction came out strongly against federalism while the smaller Fadhila, which has often aligned itself with the Sadriya, opposed implementation of autonomy now while its leader Karim al-Ya’qubi voiced support for it in principle, saying that the timing was bad, but that federalism was a constitutional right. The article quoted Dawa leader Haydar al-Abadi as saying that while the party supported federalism but had “reservations” about the bill, saying that he hoped they would be addressed as amendments were discussed.

This means that the idea of a federated Iraq has wide but qualified support. The Kurdish factions have slightly more than 20 percent of the seats, and SCIRI and Shi’a independents aligned with them have about the same, so 40-45 percent of the parliament is ardently pro-federalism. Another 13 percent of seats are held by the Dawa factions and Fadhila, which support federalism in principle but with reservations about the timing and manner of SCIRI’s current proposal. The Sadrists and the Sunnis are strongly opposed, and they make up only a third of all seats. (The UIA has four main factions, SCIRI, Dawa, Sadr and Fadhila. The remainder of the seats not accounted for here are held by small parties not prominently featured in the federalism debate.) Even some of the Sunnis, as noted, would accept federalism if sufficient conditions are attached.

The article in the Post quotes a Sadr representative, Riyadh Nuri, as saying that they were opposed to the federalism plan on principle because it would divide Iraq, and this despite the fact that “the Sadr movement enjoys wide support of the majority of the people in the center and the south.” The claim of principled opposition is constantly repeated in Iraqi debates, but the claim of majority support is not made to Arab newspapers because it is manifestly not true. While support for Sadr grew in the last elections, his faction received 22 percent of the UIA seats, or about nine percent of the entire country. The Sadriya, like Fadhila, is stronger in Basra than elsewhere in the south. We discussed the threat of the federalism plan to the Sadrists in our August 11 report, Maliki Declares Federal Control in Basra (see last two paragraphs).

The other major political topic in Iraq last week was Prime Minister Maliki’s trip to Iran, a follow-up to a recent tour of Persian Gulf Arab states and his first while in office. The trip may be of some personal significance for Maliki as well, since he himself took refuge in Iran during the Saddam era. According to an article published last Wednesday in Al-Hayat, Maliki stressed the importance of respecting Iraqi sovereignty and sealing the Iraq-Iran border. The article also quoted al-Abadi - a member of Maliki’s party - as saying that “Iraq is insistent in emphasizing to Iran that it will not wage war for any party, and that Iraq would not allow its territory to be the battleground between any regional or European country and Iran.” This seemed a way of saying that Iraq would not aid in any U.S.-led war on Iran, and that Iraq expected Iran to stay out of Iraq militarily as well.

Maliki also worked on effectuating agreements that the provinces of Basra, Amara and Najaf as well as the Kurdish regions had previously signed with the Iranian government for the provision of electricity. An article published in Al-Rafidayn emphasized that Maliki intended to press the Iranians on staying out of Iraqi affairs, and quoted a spokesman for the prime minister as saying that mediating between the U.S. and Iran