On Monday, Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) engaged in their first gunbattle with the Mahdi Army of radical cleric Muqtada al-Sadr without assistance on the ground from American troops. It took place in Diwaniya, which is located in Al-Qadisiya Province in south-central Iraq. Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki has been struggling to contain violence by the Shi’a militia which has made otherwise moderating Sunni insurgent groups hesitant about laying down their weapons. Over the past several weeks there have been a number of joint U.S.-Iraqi operations against Shi’a “death squads” which have been terrorizing Baghdad’s Sunni population. After the fight, local authorities reached a ceasefire agreement with the local Sadrist office, called Martyr Sadr, but Defense Minister Abd al-Qader al-‘Abaydi abrogated the terms of the ceasefire, which were a compromise with Sadr, and insisted on enforcing government control of the city. He also ordered an investigation into the beheading of some Iraqi soldiers.

This most recent clash appears to have ignited after Iraqi forces arrested a member of the Mahdi Army following a roadside bomb that killed two Iraqi soldiers. The gunbattle began overnight and lasted for hours. At one point, having run out of ammunition, 13 Iraqi soldiers were taken captive and then beheaded in public. ISF reinforcements arrived too late to help the original squad, but they were able to take control of most parts of the city. Fatalities included 20 ISF soldiers and 50 Sadrist militants. (Reuters, New York Times, Washington Post)

Initial reports were conflicting as to which side won the gunbattle. Al-Hayat quoted a provincial official as saying that with the arrival of reinforcements by the end of the day the ISF had control of all areas of the city except two neighborhoods (Al-Nahda and Al-Wahda). The Washington Post, by contrast, reported that the Mahdi Army had won, and that they were in control of the city, although it appears that their report relied on anecdoctal accounts. The New York Times, on the other hand, described the fighting but did not indicate that one side or the other had won.

The Iraqi newspaper Al-Rafidayn, by contrast, gave a detailed account of the ceasefire agreement which made clear that the ISF had the upper hand, but which also suggested compromise with the Sadrists. The agreement stipulated that the Mahdi Army would give up control of the city to Iraqi police but that the Iraqi army would not be allowed to enter the city for three days. The article, which was published online Monday night, indicates that Martyr Sadr had demanded that the captured militia member be freed, but this was rejected and instead the local government agreed that he would be brought before a court within 24 hours.

Yet on Wednesday Abaydi nullified any ceasefire and insisted on unconditional control of the city by legitimate Iraqi forces. The defense minister was quoted by an article published by Al-Rafidayn on Wednesday as saying

the agreement is void because it is not possible to reach an agreement with an illegal organization, especially for the Iraqi army… enforcement of the law will be quick… the government is giving a peaceable solution sufficient time, but if we do not see an end to the bearing of arms by militants and an enforcement of the law in an effective manner, well then the Iraqi army will enforce the law by force.

The article notes that the original ceasefire had been ordered by Sadr himself. An article in Al-Hayat published late Wednesday contained much of the same information, but it further added that the provincial governor and other local officials had persuaded the defense minister to abrogate the ceasefire and impose conditions as the defense ministry saw fit.

It is worth noting that Defense Minister Abaydi is Sunni and the provincial governor, Khalil Jalil, is a Shi’a member of the Supreme Council of Islamic Revolution In Iraq. SCIRI is the lead party in the ruling United Iraqi Alliance, and so formally SCIRI and the Sadr faction are allies, but in fact they are longtime rivals. While SCIRI has largely followed the line set forth by the Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani in favor of national reconciliation, the Sadrists have refused to accept the prime minister’s amnesty plan and have attempted to radicalize Iraq’s Shi’a population and maintain a state of war against Sunni Iraqis. The Sadrists’ relationship with the government in which they formally take part is illuminated by a statement from Martyr Sadr quoted in al-Hayat which is quoted as saying that the ISF was acting “as if it was an occupying army.” The same article quotes a leading Sadrist, Abu Mu’taz, as saying that they ordered their men to stand down “for fear of giving the enemy a pretext for striking at the movement and its leadership.” Sadr wants to live.

There is also to be an investigation into the gruesome executions which accompanied the fight. The demand for an investigation was made by the heads of local tribes and agreed to by the Iraqi defense ministry. Al-Rafidayn noted specifically that those tribes to which the beheaded soldiers belonged wanted to be involved in the investigation. This showdown did not make Sadr any friends.

Reuters reports on comments from Deputy Prime Minister Barham Salih that Prime Minister Maliki is planning to reshuffle the government soon, reassigning cabinet posts based upon factions’ support for the government’s policies on reconciliation. The report suggests that Sadrist ministers might be removed, and notes that one, the transport minister, has already resigned. Comments of this nature have been reported in the Iraqi press repeatedly over the past few weeks, and the fact that it is so often mentioned without execution suggests that Maliki is using these leaks as a means of pressuring Sadr.

By Kirk H. Sowell at 3:45 PM | Permalink

While much was made over Iran’s self-imposed August 22 deadline to respond to the nuclear incentives deal offered by the United Nations Security Council’s ‘Permanent Five’ members and Germany, the real deadline imposed by the UNSC has been today, August 31, 2006. But, as has been noted over the period since Iran’s August 22 ‘multifaceted response’, that ‘deadline’ has been steadily losing its meaning. In fact, it could be plausibly suggested that, apparently sans consequences, it is no longer even a deadline at all.

Iran’s confident defiance is clear, as Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad repeated the adopted Iranian mantra of nuclear rights saying, “The Iranian nation will not succumb to bullying, invasion and the violation of its rights.” The source of Iran’s confidence is the clear lack of Western resolve that is adroitly exploited by a clever Iranian regime.

China, Russia and France are expressing reluctance to impose sanctions on Iran regardless of any deadline agreed to within the Security Council. Seemingly erasing the meaning of a deadline, China’s Ambassador to the United Nations, Wang Guangya, said yesterday of Iran’s 11th hour response offered last week, “It has some ‘positive elements’ which we must study carefully.”

Traditional Western allies outside the ‘Permanent Five’ are also displaying a withering resolve as even Italy is showing signs of floundering on the issue. Said Italy’s Foreign Minister Massimo D’Alema, “If Iran is looking to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, it is not only legitimate, but can also clear the way for cooperation.”

But the difference between a civilian nuclear program and a military nuclear program are not in design or equipment differences, but merely what the output is used for. That Iran’s military is already in firm control of the Iranian nuclear program is a clear indicator of purpose. Italy’s foreign minister and others must therefore put their trust in an Iranian regime that is the world’s premiere state sponsor of terrorism. Though rarely spoken verbatim, the current conflict with Iran revolves not around materials or technology, but in fact trust.

Iran’s exploitation of differences among a conflict averse West, including today’s conveniently timed release of a Canadian-Iranian dissident from an Iran prison, continues to serve to diminish the effective meaning of today’s ‘deadline’ set by the Security Council.

While the United States has hoped for the deadline to be just that - a deadline - it remains clear that it was never to be recognized as such by other members of the Security Council. Russia is only now (again) ‘getting ready for’ talks on Iran, with a date for such talks not even yet determined on this, Iran’s so-called ‘deadline.’ Said a Russian source, “Preparatory work for the meeting of political directors of the sextet’s foreign ministries is underway. The meeting will be held, but its time and place are yet to be specified.”

So, while some headlines today - such as that from the Asia Times which reads “Time’s up for Iran on UN’s nuclear clock” - will suggest that today is the day that the Iranian nuclear program crosses a meaningful international threshold, clearly it will not.

Simply stated, there effectively is no deadline for Iranian compliance, as each time Iran crosses the line drawn in the sand without the desired answer in hand, the West merely redraws the line farther from the present, unprepared to match the Iranian regime’s will.

By Steve Schippert at 10:30 AM | Permalink | Feedback (4)

Over the course of the past week the Iraqi government’s “Operation Together Forward” - a neighborhood-by-neighborhood sweep-and-hold operation - has moved on following a promising start in the neighborhood of Ameriya to include Ghazalia, Kadhimiya, Mansour and Nura (see our recent report, Second Battle of Baghdad Underway, for background). Although some terrorist attacks have still gotten through, indications now are that while July was Baghdad’s worst month, August has seen lower daily rates of both attacks and casualties. Estimated attacks per day have declined from 52 to 31 (MNF-I).

Last week started reasonably well with the commemoration of the Shi’a religious festival of Musa, celebrating the life and martyrdom of Musa bin Jafar al-Kadhim, the seventh imam. While a sniper attack managed to kill at least 20 of the pilgrims, given that there were hundreds of thousands of pilgrims and the scale of recent violence, the attack was not nearly as deadly as it perhaps might have otherwise been. More deadly was this past weekend, when a series of attacks killed at least 60.

A number of important operations have been conducted in Baghdad and other areas in the center of the country. As recounted by Major General William Caldwell at an August 22 press conference:

In Ramadi, coalition forces captured a Saudi al Qaeda member who was actively conducting terrorist activities. During the early morning raid, one terrorist was captured and 14 others detained. The raid uncovered a suicide vest, multiple small arms and armament, along with a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device. Two more wanted terrorists were detained in another Ramadi operation. One was associated with harboring and transporting senior foreign al Qaeda leaders into Iraq…

In the Baghdad area, recent raids led to the capturing of a suspected IED cell leader, who was also suspected of a shooting death of one Iraqi interpreter and one coalition force soldier, as well as two others, wanted al Qaeda terrorists, believed to have had direct association with several recent vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices here in the city of Baghdad. Operations in Arabjabu (ph) led to the capture of two wanted terrorists associated with a senior al Qaeda and Iraq leader and part of the cell specializing in bomb making and vehicle-borne improvised explosive device. Again, all associated with attacks here in the city of Baghdad.

Near Tikrit, two terrorists and three suspects were captured, one who reportedly controlled the 40 other terrorists in the area. Credible intelligence also indicated that his terrorist cell is involved in the movement of foreign fighters into Gogee (ph) area. Reliable intelligence also indicates that the other terrorists captured in Tikrit is directly linked to the February 22nd bombing of the al-Askariya Mosque in Samarra…

Convicted insurgents and terrorists then enter the Iraqi Correctional Services to serve their sentences. To date, the Central Criminal Court of Iraq has held 1,365 trials of insurgents suspected of anti-Iraq and anti-coalition activities threatening the security of this country. These proceedings have resulted in 1,171 individual convictions with sentences ranging up to death…

MNF-I provides further information on Baghdad operations in the Doura area. This is of some special significance because in recent months Iraqi security officials have identified Doura as being an area of open and intense sectarian conflict. The most important operations in the Baghdad area this weekend seemed to be an expansion of the offensive to the Adhamiya area in northeast Baghdad on Sunday.

On August 22, the Karbala News Agency reported on “steps decided upon by American forces” to reinforce security in Baghdad and “direct overwhelming military strikes against the Mahdi Army of the Sadr faction.” The KNA has an anti-American bent and joint U.S.-Iraqi plans to strengthen security were framed in this article as an American plan achieve control over Baghdad, but it is positive to see that the perception of reinforcement is there. That some Iraqis take such reports as credible should be borne in mind by those who are surprised by resentment of coalition efforts to bring security to Iraq.

Yesterday Iraqi forces engaged in a fierce series of gunbattles with the Mahdi Army in Diwaniya, the capital of the province of Al-Qudasiya. The fight began when Iraqi forces arrested a major militia leader, attempting to enforce the government’s policy that Shi’a militias should disband and be replaced by legitimate security forces. Western and Arab news reports were in conflict as to the result, although the Iraqi newspaper Al-Rafidayn reported that there was a ceasefire in which the militia formally recognized government control of the city. An initial military report also gave limited information. ThreatsWatch will provide a fuller analysis of this important engagement once more information is available.

By Kirk H. Sowell at 9:00 AM | Permalink

While much is made of Hassan Nasrallah’s newfound popularity on the ‘Arab Street,’ particularly in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, a different, far less heroic perception among the Lebanese is held by many – including Lebanese Shi’a leaders in the war-torn south – as Israel and Lebanon alike await the arrival of European forces under UN Resolution 1701 mandate.

In a Lebanese television interview, Hassan Nasrallah said that he regretted giving the order to attack the IDF and capture two soldiers on July 12. His contrition is clearly more a reaction to increasingly vocal Lebanese displeasure with Hizballah’s determination to attack Israel than it is a reaction to the Israeli response to his invitation to war. Nasrallah said, “We did not think, even one percent, that the capture would lead to a war at this time and of this magnitude. You ask me, if I had known on July 11… that the operation would lead to such a war, would I do it? I say no, absolutely not.”

As Israeli officials point to this as an indication that their operations have deterred Hizballah, this may be an over-stated reality. While to a large degree the effects of Israeli deterrence may be true, the perception of deterrence comes from the shedding of the victorious Hizballah tone. This moderation has not come about by IDF actions as much as it has developed before the glare of Lebanese criticism, the most biting coming from the Shi’a themselves.

The Shi’a Mufti of Tyre Sayyed Ali al-Amin criticized Hizballah for bringing war upon Lebanon while calling for the Lebanese government to take responsibility for the entirety of Lebanon’s territory and peoples. He said to that end, “The Lebanese experience has proved the failure of communities and parties defending and protecting themselves alone; thus, there is no substitute for one state to which everyone, without exception, belongs.” But while he condemned both the Israeli attacks that followed Hizballah’s actions and the Lebanese government for ceding the largely Shi’a south to Hizballah, his criticism of Hizballah was both direct and sharp.

“I don’t think Hizballah asked the Shi’ite community about the war. Perhaps the great emigration from the south is the best proof that the people of the south were against the war. The Shi’ite community authorized no one to declare war in its name or to drag it into a war that was far from its wishes and from the wishes of the other ethnic communities in Lebanon. What happened in the south does not represent the will of the Shi’ite community, and is not its responsibility, but was caused by the vacuum that the Lebanese state left for years in this region… What happened is the natural result of a state relinquishing its duty to defend a region and its citizens.”

As European troops are set to arrive in Lebanon to bolster the UNIFIL presence there, Israel hopes that their activities there will be far more effective than the past UNIFIL performance. Criticism of UN troops in South Lebanon reach beyond the historic ineptitude since the UNIFIL inception. Anger is emerging at specific instances where the UN-flagged troops appear to have taken sides during their position-neutral mission, including most recently UNIFIL publicly detailing IDF troop movements in southern Lebanon via Press releases on the United Nations website.

To that end, the IDF uncovered a Hizballah bunker that is described as being “a mere stone’s throw” from an existing UNIFIL post. It is troubling to Israel that the bunker had “shooting positions of poured concrete” complete with phone lines, showers, toilets, air ducts, and emergency exits as well as Katyusha rockets. A 40-meter wide bunker stretching 2 kilometers complete with poured concrete and amenities cannot possibly have been constructed within such close proximity unnoticed by UNIFIL troops, historically mandated with a primary mission of observation and monitoring.

While Nasrallah’s Hizballah is attempting damage control in the eyes of the Lebanese public, many Lebanese are increasingly vocal in their anger at Nasrallah’s arrogant assumption of Lebanese foreign policy decision-making authority. At the same time, criticism from the other side of Lebanon’s tense border makes it clear that the newly mandated UNIFIL expansion must carry with it a fundamental change in operational procedures and practices – including delivering on its requirement to disarm Hizballah – if the ceasefire between Israel and Hizballah is to have any hope of lasting. It is clearly in the interests of both the Israeli public and the Lebanese people.

By Steve Schippert at 9:00 AM | Permalink

Last week Lieutenant General Robert Fry, Britian’s highest level officer in Iraq and Deputy Commander of Multinational Force-Iraq, gave his second Pentagon press briefing since taking command in May. Most notable were his comments on the security situation in Basra (see our August 11 report on this issue) and Iranian arms smuggling. Also of significance last week was the withdrawal of British troops from a base near Amara in the Maysan Province, on Iraq’s southeast border with Iran. This appears to have been related to a need to redeploy British troops to deal with Iranian activity, although the withdrawal did not take place without incident. Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki also declared that transfer of security control in the Dhiqar Province in Iraq’s south-central region would be postponed, and both military readiness and political conditions were cited.

On August 22 Fry gave a press briefing in Arlington, Virginia in which he discussed a range of issues related to security in southern Iraq (full text of Fry’s comments). General Fry focused on Al-Muthanna, Basra and Iran, saying that Iraqi forces were maintaining security in Al-Muthanna without difficulty but that Basra was more problematic. Excerpted here are some of Fry’s comments especially germane to key security issues:

…As far as Basra itself is concerned, I think we’ve had an intervention of central government into local government. And I’m sure you’re aware that Prime Minister Maliki intervened in terms of the local security architecture, to make sure that a committee answerable directly to him would be put in place and make sure that he could have the most intimate control over what was going on in Basra…

I think I made a particular reference to Muthanna rather than Basra. Basra is an entirely separate province, and indeed the situation is different there. I think we’ve got a complex situation in Basra quite different from the situation in Baghdad and quite different from the one that we see, for example, in Anbar province.

The situation in Basra is about the competition for wealth and power, but within one concessional community, in this case, the Shi’a community, and I think we have what are essentially a political contest in particular between various factions. Now, to some extent, those factions have infiltrated not so much the Iraqi army, but some elements of the Iraqi police service. We recognize that, and we’re going to great lengths to make sure that those people who have been successful at infiltrating themselves are turfed out. And we’ve done a series of detention operations recently in order to bring about exactly that.

Now, again, I mentioned earlier on the fact that Prime Minister Maliki has intervened personally in Basra, and it was precisely to ensure that this happened, that he made that intervention. So I think that we do face problems, but we recognize precisely what those problems are, and we’re taking remedial measures to make sure that they’re properly addressed.

I think we’ve got some pretty clear evidence of the way in which the Iranians are involved in sectarian violence, and certainly we know that some of the arms coming into this country and being used in attacks against the security forces are provided by Iran. Certainly we believe that there is money and maybe even some training being involved for those involved in the use of violence inside Iraq. And on top of that, of course, you have a sustained Iranian rhetoric, both within the region as a whole but also making its views on the situation inside Iraq known very, very clearly…

A significant event this past week was the withdrawal of British forces from a base near Amara, the capital of the Maysan Province. The base, a former Baathist regime military installation, was called Camp Abu Naji, and at least some of the troops were to redeploy along the Iraq-Iran border in the area in order to stop arms smuggling from Iran to Shi’a militias. Unfortunately, the withdrawal did not go smoothly. The Karbala News Agency reported that on August 23, the day before the planned withdrawal, there was an exchange of fire in the Old Hussein neighborhood in Amara. The KNA tends to have a strong anti-Western bias, and gave no indication of an underlying cause other than to say that one individual was killed and locals reacted violently. The British military has not released a press report on the incident.

Then, following the British redeployment away from the Amara area, the abandoned base was ransacked by looters (Washington Post). The incident does not reflect well on local security, although concern for the security of the base after withdrawal does not seem to have been great. British officials responded to questions by saying that the base was now the Iraqis’ responsibility, and the Post notes that local Iraqi forces called the governor to get permission to return fire on armed looters, and apparently did not get it until the looting was almost done. The Post article also noted that there had been mortor shelling from militia elements loyal to Muqtada al-Sadr, so the fight in Amara may have been related.

Regarding the situation in the south-central province of Dhiqar, which is directly west of Maysan, the Iraqi newspaper Al-Rafidayn published an article on Wednesday regarding the decision by Prime Minister Maliki to postpone transfer of security responsibility from Italian to Iraqi forces for a time. The article quotes several local figures about the reasons for the decision. Given the recent electoral victory of the left in Italy, the Italian government has decreed that its troops would leave Iraq by the end of the year. Italian forces were criticized for not being interested in the preparedness of Iraqi forces, and Maliki himself gave the lack of military preparation as the prime reason for the postponement.

Yet local officials pointed to political conflicts, and two individuals in particular were blamed. One was the Shi’a cleric Muhammad al-Hassani al-Sarkhi, whose militia elements have been interfering with local security and walking around with their weapons in defiance of the legitimate security forces. Al-Rafidayn makes mention of the recent conflict between Sarkhi’s militia and security forces in Karbala, on which we reported last week. The other figure blamed was Shirwan Al-Wa’ili, a member of the federal parliament from Dhiqar who was the first to declare that Iraqi forces would be taking over, and who was criticized for wanting to take control of the province in any federal autonomy plan, which has been advocated by Shi’a leaders.

By Kirk H. Sowell at 8:20 AM | Permalink

[Updated below.]

FOX News journalists Steve Centanni and Olaf Wiig were released in Gaza, two weeks after their abduction by a group calling iself the Holy Jihad Brigades. As part of their conditional release, Centanni and Wiig were required to make a statement on video tape that they denounced the US and Israel and accepted Islam as their faith, sure to be used for propaganda purposes.

Disturbingly, Haaretz reports that “senior Palestinian security officials said Sunday the name [Holy Jihad Brigades] was a front for local militants, and that Palestinian authorities had known the identity of the kidnappers from the start.”

Palestinian Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh went one step further, suggesting that not only were the kidnappers local Palestinians, but that al-Qaeda has zero presence in Gaza or the West Bank. Said Haniyeh, “The kidnappers have no link to al-Qaeda or any other organization or faction. al-Qaeda as an organization does not exist in the Gaza Strip.”

While the terrorists who abducted Wiig and Centanni may well have been local Palestinians, the position that there is zero al-Qaeda presence in Gaza or the West Bank runs counter to both Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas and Egyptian intelligence statements earlier in the year.

With al-Qaeda’s clear attempts to branch into Lebanon, which has seen mixed success, it is logical that the more chaotic West Bank and Gaza territories are even more enticing locales for al-Qaeda expansion attempts, regardless of Haniyeh’s denial.

A Christian Science Monitor report details the ordeal at the hands of the self-procalimed Holy Jihad Brigades as told by Centanni and Wiig at a press conference following their release. In Centanni’s words, the ordeal began as they traveled the narrow streets of Gaza City two weeks ago. “We were driving down a narrow side street in Gaza City. There was a car stopped in front of us, and before we realized what it was, four of them [gunmen] came over to our car, and stuffed us in the back seat of a tiny Toyota and flipped a black hood over our heads. We were crunched down toward the floor and they sped away.”

After two weeks of captivity and the kidnappers’ demands of all Muslim prisoners release from American prisons having gone ignored, the captors settled for a taped ‘conversion to Islam’ at gunpoint.

Said Olaf Wiig of their abduction, “My biggest concern, really, is that as a result of happened to us, foreign journalists would be discouraged from coming here to tell the story and that would be a great tragedy to the people of Palestine and of Gaza in particular.”

To that end, most foreign news agencies have already pulled their foreign staff members from Gaza.

UPDATE: New Zealand media reports that ‘al-Qaeda Rejects’ Kidnapped Centanni & Wiig in Gaza.

By Steve Schippert at 3:15 PM | Permalink

In what can be seen as a further negative response to demands that Iran cease uranium enrichment activities, Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad took part in a Saturday ceremony officially opening Iran’s first heavy water production plant in Khondab, near the Arak heavy water reactor currently under construction and reportedly due to be operational in less than three years.

One source from within Iran noted that the facility had actually been operational for over a month, indicating that Ahmadinejad’s ceremony was specifically timed to take place during Exploitation Week for international consumption.

Said Ahmadinejad, “We tell the Western countries not to cause trouble for themselves because Iranian people are determined to make progress and acquire technology.” He added that Iran is “not a threat to anybody, even the Zionist regime,” a statement that can only be taken seriously by those who refuse to acknowledge Iran’s material support for Hizballah, founded and guided by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps over twenty years ago.

Iran remains undeterred by nations utilizing a UN vehicle to influence their nuclear operations. If the Arak heavy water reactor comes online when expected, Iran will be producing plutonium for nuclear weapons unhindered in less time than has expired since the US invasion of Iraq in 2003.

The advantage that a heavy water reactor provides – utilizing the heavy water produced by the Khondab site - is the ability to use raw uranium ore rather than enriched uranium as fuel, completely circumventing the enrichment process Iran is now perfecting. One of the valuable byproducts of the spent fuel is plutonium. By weight, it takes little more than 15% of the weight of a uranium bomb to produce the same nuclear explosive results using plutonium. This makes a plutonium weapon far easier to deliver via missile, which Iran is also developing at a sprinter’s pace with North Korean assistance.

Before Ahmadinejad’s ceremonial opening of the heavy water production plant, Ayatollah Hojatoleslam Khatami, a member of Iran’s Assembly of Experts, during Friday prayers in Tehran “called on Russia and China, the two veto-wielding permanent members of the UN Security Council, not to fall [into the] trap of the US.” While they have been largely recognized as ‘on board’ in calling for Iran’s cessation of uranium enrichment, whether Russia and/or China will actually vote for meaningful sanctions to be put on Iran is in doubt.

Former Iranian President Mohammad Khatami warned in a Tokyo speech that the West is “pouring gasoline over a fire,” and reiterated that Iran simply wants to acquire nuclear technology to generate electricity for its citizens. With much controversy, Khatami has been issued a visa to visit and speak in the United States in September at the Washington National Cathedral.

With the ongoing and unhindered Iranian nuclear program advancing along apace and Iran’s repeated claims of only seeking peaceful nuclear power, it must be recognized that there is little physical distinction between a civilian and a military nuclear program. As the research director at the Arms Control Association, Wade Boese, put it, “If you have a civilian nuclear program with enrichment and reprocessing facilities, you can have a military program. The civilian versus military is kind of what comes out at the end — bombs or energy.”

It is not a technical matter. It comes down to a matter of human emotion: Trust.

Do those in the West trust that the world’s premiere state sponsor of terrorism seeks nuclear power, whether through light water reactors, heavy water reactors or both?

By Steve Schippert at 1:50 PM | Permalink

A federal district court judge has ruled (full text of decision) that a National Security Agency (NSA) wiretapping program which monitors communications between terrorist suspects outside the United States and individuals inside the U.S. is both unconstitutional and in violation of the 1978 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). The suit was filed by a variety of organizations and individuals, including the American Civil Liberties Union, who argued that the program violated their First Amendment right to free speech. They further contended that it violated FISA, which requires that a warrant be obtained if persons involved in the communications are “U.S. persons.” They made a similar argument regarding a NSA data-mining program. The government argued that the plaintiffs’ claims were barred by the application of the “state secrets privilege,” which requires dismissal of a case if continuance of it would require divulgence of state secrets, and further argued that the individuals in question did not have standing, meaning that they had suffered no individual compensable injury.

The Washington Post described the decision:

A federal judge in Detroit ruled yesterday that the National Security Agency’s warrantless surveillance program is unconstitutional, delivering the first decision that the Bush administration’s effort to monitor communications without court oversight runs afoul of the Bill of Rights and federal law.

U.S. District Judge Anna Diggs Taylor ordered a halt to the wiretap program, secretly authorized by President Bush in 2001, but both sides in the lawsuit agreed to delay that action until a Sept. 7 hearing. Legal scholars said Taylor’s decision is likely to receive heavy scrutiny from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit when the Justice Department appeals, and some criticized her ruling as poorly reasoned…

SCOTUS Blog has a more detailed discussion of the decision. According to this and other published reports, the court rejected the plaintiffs’ claims as to the data-mining program, but concluded that the state secrets privilege did not apply to the wiretapping program because the government had admitted to its existence and discussed it in sufficient detail for the court to rule on its constitutionality and legality. The court found that the free speech of the plaintiffs had been harmed because individuals living in the Middle East sometimes refused to speak to them over the phone for fear of being wiretapped.

If this decision is upheld, the practical implication would be that wiretaps would have to be delayed several hours for a warrant to be obtained. Fuller analysis of this decision and its implications for national security to follow.

By Kirk H. Sowell at 11:11 PM | Permalink

Gunbattles broke out this past week in the Iraqi holy city of Karbala between Iraqi Security Forces and the followers of the Shi’a cleric Mahmud al-Hassani (also called al-Sharkhi), who is described in Western news reports as being hostile to the United States (AP, AP). This account is according to the Associated Press:

…The fighting, which began early Tuesday, spread to at least four other parts of Karbala by afternoon in violation of a curfew. Gunmen in civilian clothes could be seen firing AK-47 rifles, machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades at army patrols and running away. Soldiers fired indiscriminately at groups of gunmen roaming the streets.

The violence started after Iraqi soldiers raided the office of cleric Mahmoud al-Hassani before dawn, apparently because his supporters had taken over a field behind the building for security reasons, said Ahmed al-Ghazali, an aide to the cleric. He claimed the soldiers opened fire but the cleric’s supporters did not respond. Army officials could not be immediately reached to confirm the claim…

It sounds like AP may have gotten a one-sided version of events here; where there is a legal security force and an illegal militia, the security forces will need to have robust rules of engagement to fire at men in civilian clothes carrying weapons in the streets if they are going to survive. The Iraqi newspaper Al-Mada reports that the initial conflict was caused when Hassani made a statement on Iraqi TV urging his militia to gather in Karbala, and government forces decided to cut them off from the city so that security control might remain in the hands of official forces.

Al-Rafidayn reported on the issue, and it included a statement from supporters of Hassani but notes that he agreed to respect the authority of the government. It further reported that Hawza al-Sadiq, Hassani’s office, was placed under guard, and the entire city was placed under curfew until Friday. It is clear from the article that the local civilian provincial administration was involved in calling in the security forces, as they are described as pressuring Hassani to obey the law. The truce agreement itself is between them and Hassani, not Hassani and the security forces.

A separate article in Al-Rafidayn reported that when the dust had settled, five had been killed, including two from the security services, 17 injured and 281 militiamen taken prisoner. This same article quotes a variety of businessmen by name as complaining about the increase in the price of food due to restrictions on vehicles entering the city during the week, and as a result people couldn’t afford food. One seller of vegetables, Ali Hussein, said that “We understand what the security services are doing because of events which have happened here in the city but prices have increased and this is the law of the market…” It is notable that Karbala citizens are willing to be quoted by name both supporting the government against a local cleric and complaining about the conditions brought about by government actions.

Iraqi Shi’ism has a loose authority structure that allows for individual clerics to sponsor political parties and/or militias loyal to themselves while still giving token deference to the Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, recognized as Iraq’s senior religious figure. The cleric involved here, Hassani, is not an ayatollah, but nevertheless he has armed men working outside legitimate security services working for him. Karbala is considered to be the holiest city in Shi’a Islam, being the site of the martyrdom of the grandson of the Prophet Muhammad, who had risen up against the then-ruling Umayyad dynasty (661-750 AD), viewing it as unislamic.

This is how things need to work for order to be maintained in Iraq and the legitimacy of the state to be preserved - no American troops were involved as Iraqi Security Forces troops and local police responded to a request by local civilian authorities to maintain order against a militia. While initial reports indicated that the security forces were having difficulties keeping militiamen off the streets, they forced Hassani to agree to a statement favorable to the government, and appear to have prevented a large-scale incident.

By Kirk H. Sowell at 12:00 PM | Permalink

As part of the ongoing ‘Blow of Zolfaghar’ operations along Iran’s border regions, Iran test fired 10 Saegheh surface-to-surface missiles in the southeast desert of Iran between Tehran and the Afghanistan border. The Saegheh missiles have a stated range of between about 50 and 150 miles and are not believed to be nuclear-capable.

The maneuvers have been described by Iran as having the purpose of implementing and practicing a “new defensive doctrine.” However, upon closer inspection, very little appears to be ‘new’ and, in fact, looks to be an indigenous implementation of the strategy, tactics and weaponry employed by Hizballah in the latest hot conflict with Israel.

The implementation of the doctrine developed for Hizballah and shepherded by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps in Lebanon was made abundantly clear when Iranian Army commander Maj. Gen. Ataollah Salehi said of the maneuvers, “The enemy has gone insane because of the capabilities of Lebanon’s Hizballah. And given the insane enemy’s history, we should always be prepared.” Clearly, however, it is Iran’s Hizballah, not Lebanon’s.

Ironically, Iranian Army spokesman General Mohammad Reza Ashtiani said last week, “We have to be prepared against any threat and we should be a role model for other countries.” But Hizballah has been the role model, albeit through Iranian doctrine, training, funding and weapons supplies.

Most lethal for the IDF in Lebanon was Hizballah’s supply of AT-14 Kornet anti-tank missiles capable of defeating the Merkavas’ Active Armor through a double-explosive timed warhead. But also effective against IDF ground forces were elaborate tunnel systems used for hiding and moving men and weapons, body armor, night vision goggles and night vision cameras placed at observation posts, top-notch encrypted communications gear, and computer-equipped command bunkers among other assorted tools of the trade normally associated with a state army, including the immense stores of various Iranian/Syrian rockets and missiles – including the C-802 anti-ship missile and UAV’s.

The overall employment of these assets – along with intensely motivated terrorist foot soldiers and blended IRGC ‘human resources’ – took the form of swarming ambushes on IDF units on ground that Hizballah was intimately familiar with and had prepared – with Iran - well in advance and over the course of six years since the Israeli pullout of 2000.

The difference between the indigenous Iranian implementation of the Hizballah experiment is that the Saegheh surface-to-surface missiles tested this weekend would be employed against advancing troops invading Iranian territory rather than rained down on civilian population centers. But, Iran has more than enough in its arsenal to take that task on simultaneously as well.

The extent to which Iran intends to take on any new defensive posture now may be indicated by the words of Iranian Foreign Ministry Spokesman Hamid Reza Asefi, who condemned Israel in more ways than one when he said, “It has now been proved more than ever that the existence of the Zionist regime in this region is the root cause of tensions and crises in the Middle-East.” He went on, adding, “The events that took place in Lebanon mark the count down for the Zionist regime’s collapse.”

The significance of his reference to the very “existence” of Israel – as opposed to Israel’s actions or perceived belligerence - should not be dismissed. Iran’s ‘Blow of Zolfaghar’ operation conveniently puts the lion’s share of forces on her east and west borders in a ready-made defense.

It is not beyond plausibility that Iran may be preparing not a ‘new defensive doctrine,’ but rather a perimeter defense at the ready for the next round of fighting between Iran’s Hizballah foreign legion and Israel in conjunction with their expected defiance of UN Security Council demands that they cease their uranium enrichment program.

By Steve Schippert at 8:45 AM | Permalink

Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Hamid Reza Asefi made the Iranian position clear as he reiterated that Iran wants to negotiate everything…except enrichment. Said Asefi, “Everything has to come out of negotiations. Suspension is not on our agenda.”

He went on, doing nothing to clear the muddied waters that have served Iran so well on the international stage thus far. Adding that “the proposal has had several dimensions, our answer will be multi-dimensional too,” Iran may hope to exhaust the muddy waters strategy even in refusing both the West’s incentives package and the UN Security Council demands that Iran halt all enrichment activities by August 30. Whether Iran finds enough receptive audience members remaining to further the game is an unanswered question, yet Iran appears confident in their gamble that they will find useful interference once again.

The “multi-dimensional response” from Iran in the next 48 hours can be expected to be consistent with their past position that they are always willing to negotiate, but that enrichment is an ‘inalienable right’ and thus non-negotiable. There is little else the West cares to negotiate, considering the incentives package included more reactors and outside fuel supplies along with lopsided trade packages and the lifting of sanctions already in place.

Aside from an unobstructed nuclear weapons program, Iran continues to profit directly from the conflict they have a hand in stirring, as oil prices are once again on the rise. With 80% of Iran’s revenues generated from oil and natural gas export, fiery rhetoric translates into windfalls.

Little of that windfall, however, finds its way to the Iranian public, as it is largely used to fund the enormous expense of the Iranian nuclear weapons program and external forays, such as the ‘Hearts and Minds’ public relations effort currently being underwritten by the Iranian government in Lebanon in order to solidify public support for Hizballah going forward. As much as $12,000 per person is being handed out to Lebanese civilians for no more than producing identification and signing a receipt. That Iran ensured Hizballah once again delivered aid before the Lebanese government is a major reason for Hizballah’s popularity in Lebanon, with their Iranian-suppled handouts far more popular than the fanatical religious ideology that drives Hizballah’s incessant war with Israel.

While the Iranian government enjoys the windfall at least partially driven by their own rhetoric – an redistributes that windfall away from its own population – they will also enjoy more than a full week between their anticipated August 22 response to the West’s nuclear package and the actual August 31 deadline for enrichment cessation.

Iran’s response on August 22 can be expected to be a Muddy Waters approach, including a refusal to cease enrichment couched within calls for negotiation and diplomatic talks. Little if any change in position from any point selected at random over the past three years should be expected. In the week that will follow, Iran will be gauging the American and European response, looking to exploit cracks and weaknesses ahead of the August 31 UNSC deadline.

The Security Council handed Iran this exploitation buffer by naming their firm deadline only after Ahmadinejad announced his own August 22 intentions. For those suspicious of nefarious action by Iran on August 22, perhaps the date on the calendar to circle for vigilance is August 31 instead. Iran is likely to enjoy their gift-wrapped ‘Exploitation Week’ far too much to pass up.

By Steve Schippert at 12:00 AM | Permalink | Feedback (1)

The month of July may have been the deadliest since the fall of the Baathist regime, with Baghdad alone having about 2,000 killed, mostly civilians. Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki’s security plan for the capital, Operation Together Forward, began in late June, but has mostly consisted of scattered raids on Sunni terror cells and Shi’a death squads, while an expected neighborhood-by-neighborhood sweep-and-hold operation of the entire city has been kept on hold until this week. Over the past few weeks U.S. troops have been realigning from outlaying areas, handing over security control to Iraqi forces and moving toward Baghdad. Referred to as “Phase II,” this more systematic urban offensive seems to have begun this week.

Regarding the achievements of Phase I, MNF-I has reported that “During Phase I, which began July 9, Iraqi Security Forces and MND-B Soldiers have killed or captured 411 murderers associated with death squads. Together the combined forces conducted more than 32,382 combat patrols, seized more than 43 weapons and ammunition caches.” A large number of coalition raids have taken place successfully recently in Baghdad and elsewhere, including raid in the Arab Jabour area of Baghdad in which 60 terrorists suspects were captured. The targets of the operation were believed to be associated with a senior al-Qaeda leader specializing in bomb making and IED attacks. These efforts, however, have obviously been inadequate.

Al-Hayat has more details on Phase II, reporting that an additional 5,500 American and 6,000 Iraqi troops are to reinforce the capital. This is part of a realignment in which the 4th Iraqi Army Division is taking over security for Kirkuk (Al-Ta’meem Province), Salah al-Din Province (Samarra is the capital) and Sulaymaniya Province; all in the Sunni north. This adds to the provinces of al-Muthana (Samawa), al-Dhiqar (Nasiriya) and Maysan, all in the south, so that six provinces are now under Iraqi security. The article quotes the head of Baghdad security, Mahdi Sabih, as specifically mentioning that the areas of Dawra, al-Khadra’ and al-‘Aamariya as areas of focus.

And it was in al-‘Aamariya that coalition forces began Phase II this week. As reported by MNF-I:

…The Iraqi and Coalition forces searched about 6,000 houses and buildings in the Ameriya neighborhood, said Jaleel. The local citizens requested the market area be secured first. “We re-opened shops that had been closed and a neighborhood gas station,” he said. The 2nd Brigade Combat Team commander, Col. Robert Scurlock Jr., re-iterated Jaleel’s point, noting that people are returning to the streets. “More than 50 percent of the shops have re-opened,” Jaleel said.

Jaleel and Scurlock see the market as a way to repair the neighborhood that was torn apart by violence. “We want to get the stores open and get people back to a normal life,” said Scurlock. He credited his fellow troops for helping to restore peace in Ameriya. “It’s the dedication of Iraqi soldiers and their professionalism and sharing information with Coalition forces,” said Scurlock. According to Scurlock, eight arrests were made and 128 weapons seized. “We’re making progress,” he said…

Once U.S. and Iraqi forces have swept an area, it will be up to Iraqi national police to maintain order. According to MNF-I, Iraqi Interior Ministry forces, considered the national police, have reached 92 percent of the intended strength of 188,000, and are 90 percent trained and 83 percent equipped. Of those areas of Baghdad outside the control of the government, some are controlled by Sunni jihadists, some by Shi’a militia cells, and some are subject to total chaos. It will now be up to U.S. and Iraqi troops to lock down these neighborhoods one by one, and Iraqi police will then have to hold them. Their mettle will be verified soon.

The death toll in Baghdad during July was simply ghastly, and Phase II of the offensive could not be put off any longer if the government was to retain credibility. The violence has of course grabbed the headlines in the Western press; the Iraqi media has contained articles with headlines about people waking up in the morning and finding bodies in the streets or floating in the river. Suicide attacks have continued to succeed in August; a suicide bomber killed nine in Samarra on August 7, four different bombers killed a total of 19 in Baghdad on the 8th, a bombing in Najaf on the 10th targeting a Shi’a shrine killed 35, multiple bombs killed more than 40 on the 13th in Baghdad, and on the 16th multiple bombs killed another 21 in Baghdad, among other attacks.

Aside from the apparently increased efficacy of the Iraqi military, the main positive in July came from the strong reception to the prime minister’s amnesty and reconciliation initiative, which we have discussed in a number of previous reports. This draining of the domestic Iraqi insurgency may explain the apparent ease with which Iraqi troops have now taken over several provinces, although time will tell whether the government can maintain its hold on these areas, especially those in the Sunni center and west. Those who are seeking to destroy Iraqi public’s consensus in favor of reconciliation - largely foreign jihadists, mainly al-Qaeda, and Muqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army - have stepped into what would have been a void in violence and actually increased it by focusing on civilians rather than U.S. or Iraqi troops. So while some of the pieces have been coming together for the Iraqi government, time is not on the government’s side, and the Second Battle of Baghdad can wait no more.

By Kirk H. Sowell at 11:00 AM | Permalink | Feedback (6)

Iran has announced that it is going to begin major military maneuvers on Saturday, August 19, just two days ahead of its expected response to the West’s nuclear proposal designed to entice them away from nuclear enrichment and, thus, nuclear weapons.

Iranian General Mohammad Reza Ashtiani announced that the exercise, “Blow of Zolfaghar,” will be extensive and “take place in West and East Azerbaijan, Kurdistan, Baluchestan va Sistan, and Khorasan provinces.” This covers the Afghanistan, Pakistan and Turkey borders completely, as well as the Iraqi border from Turkey south past Kirkuk towards Baghdad.

The UK’s Times notes that border patrols throughout have been increased since last week and observes that Iran’s “bristly gestures will only add to regional tension.”

Whatever does – or does not – happen with regards to Iran on August 22nd, the following eight days after their expected response leading up to the August 30 deadline set by the United Nations Security Council will almost certainly be filled with diplomatic wrangling. Ahmadinejad will work hard to convince the world that Iran is indeed finally prepared to somehow negotiate what is repeatedly called their ‘inalienable right.’

But after August 30 passes, the United States expects UN sanctions against Iran to be put in place with little delay. This position presumes cooperation from both Russia and China, each of whom have been clear in the past that they oppose any sanctions against their valued trading partner, though they have used nuanced language of late softening this position.

How they react when push comes to shove at the Security Council will be telling. It very well may not be as hoped for by an America percieved to be weaker in the international community as the days, conflicts and events go by without pause.

The timing of what is termed ‘defensive exercises’ announcement by Iran is curious, especially in light of word that a North Korean nuclear test could be imminent. American satellite images have detected “suspicious vehicle movement” near the P’unggye-yok underground test facility in North Korea. Reportedly observed by US intelligence were long cables being run into the underground facility, a process used to connect sensors near an underground blast to monitoring equipment above ground and a safe distance away.

This activity was also observed last year, but no nuclear test was undertaken.

One speculation – taking the events and forcing them into the same context – would interpret the Iranian exercises as an actual perimeter defense deployment ahead of events known by Iran and expected to be perceived as provocative. That event could potentially be an Iranian rejection of the nuclear proposal simultaneous with a nuclear demonstration by their chief technology proliferation partner, North Korea.

While this is an example of speculation, at least considering such possibilities becomes increasingly important as Ahmadinejad’s apocalyptic fellow-believers gain more and more power within Iran. (Note the sudden absence of student protests that were so prevalent until recently.) Ahmadinejad’s faithful membership within the Hojjatieh Society guides his thinking and his choices for leadership positions within Iran, as the Hojjatieh seek to “pave the way for the return of the Mahdi.”

Westerners would find Hojjatieh beliefs and practices so disturbing as to be hardly believable. Yet these are indeed the beliefs and practices of the increasingly more powerful Iranian president and his mentor, Ayatollah Mohammad Taqi Mesbah-Yazdi, often referred to as “The Crocodile,” for his beneath-the-surface exercise of political power, and as “The Sorcerer,” for his cultic religious practices, the likes of which most Americans would dismiss as insane and, therefor, impossible to be true among a nation’s powerful elite.

Yet, through Ahmadinejad and Ayatollah Yazdi, unthinkable belief structure is increasingly guiding the direction of Iranian policy, strategy and actions.

The world can scarcely afford to underestimate the mindset of the Iranian president as he accrues more and more power within Iran, including solid allegiance from the Bassij and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, which in many ways should be increasingly considered in parallel to Hitler’s SS.

By Steve Schippert at 9:35 AM | Permalink | Feedback (5)

While the world appears dismissive of Israeli evidence of Hizballah’s advanced Russian anti-tank missiles obtained from Iran and Syria, for the Iranians, the victory celebration shared with fellow-enabler Syria and Hizballah continues unabated.

Mahmoud Ahmadinejad delivered a fiery speech in Iran, in which he proclaimed that, through Hizballah’s victory, delivered more at the hands of a lack of will on the part of Israel and the West than by Hizballah’s proclaimed might, “God’s promises have come true.” Ahmadinejad’s again speech included more defiant intransigence toward the UN Security Council’s demand that Iran cease its enrichment program, saying, “If they think they can use a resolution as a stick against us, they should know that Iranian people do not bend to language of force.”

In an answer to those wondering what Iran’s response to the West’s proposal and UN demands may be, Ahmadinejad telegraphed, “We will give our response on the announced date [Rajab 27 - August 21 & 22], and our reply will be based on defending the absolute rights of the Iranian people.” The Iranian crowd followed that by chanting “Nuclear energy is our undeniable right.” There should be little question as to the substance of the coming Iranian response, leaving to question only the nature of the response.

While Ahmadinejad was praising the Iranian foreign legion, Ayatollah Ahmad Khatami, who sits on the regime’s Assembly of Experts, warned Israel to beware Iran’s missile capabilities declaring “They must fear the day (Iran’s) 2,000-kilometre range missiles land in the heart of Tel Aviv.” This was preceded by praise for Hizballah and their Iranian Katyushas for turning “Israel into a country of ghosts.”

Following the weekend IDF takeover of Ghandouriyeh, a south Lebanese town just east of the coastal Hizballah stronghold of Tyre, Israel found evidence of Russian-made advanced anti-tank missiles supplied through Syria. Outside a mosque, the IDF discovered a van loaded with the empty casings of 6-foot long AT-5 Spandrel anti-tank missiles of Russian design. Serial numbers identified the design of the missile that once filled the tubes. Iran began duplicating the wire-guided anti-tank weapon in 2000.

But even more troubling was another nearby find by the IDF, where eight Syrian-supplied Russian Kornet anti-tank missiles were found unexpended near a Hizballah post. The Kornet is a laser-guided anti-tank missile with a 3-mile range, and the warhead is of a double-blast design in order to defeat modern armor technologies. Written on the casings of each of the Kornets was “Customer: Ministry of Defence of Syria. Supplier: KBP, Tula, Russia.”

Hizballah’s state-supplied anti-tank capabilities was the primary cause for the IDF’s cautious ground operational pace as well as the cause of death for most of its losses incurred while engaging Hizballah terrorists.

Whether or not the world will choose to acknowledge this clear evidence of state-sponsorship of terrorism remains to be seen. Critics will likely argue that it will not, lest such disturbing information disrupt the recently won peace in the region through the UN-inspired ceasefire.

As the Israeli evidence was being made public, Syria’s Bahsar Assad was delivering a speech of his own, praising Hizballah and echoing Iran’s Ahmadinejad by declaring that any American vision of the Middle East “has now become an illusion” on the heels of Hizballah’s victory. Assad continued, “We tell them (Israelis) that after tasting humiliation in the latest battles, your weapons are not going to protect you - not your planes, or missiles, or even your nuclear bombs. The future generations in the Arab world will find a way to defeat Israel.”

The German foreign minister canceled his planned Syria trip mid-flight, describing Assad’s words as “going in completely the wrong direction.” Whether or not supplying Hizballah with lethal laser-guided Russian Kornet anti-tank missiles is interpreted as also “going in completely the wrong direction” remains to be seen.

By Steve Schippert at 10:15 AM | Permalink | Feedback (1)

U.S. and Iraqi government forces have repeatedly clashed with the Shi’a militia loyal to the radical cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, referred to as the Mahdi Army. Tensions have been high, as we have reported on several occasions (see especially our July 26 report, Sadr Faction Threatens to Turn on Maliki Government). There were two more important clashes this past week, the first on Monday August 7, targeting a Mahdi death squad. Reactions to the raid revealed strains within the government, as Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki claimed not to have been aware of the raid, and criticized it, while the Iraqi Defense Ministry confirmed approval. The second clash, this past Sunday, targeted militiamen in the Iraqi Health Ministry, which is headed by a Sadrist cabinet member, Ali al-Shamri.

Western and military sources (MNF-I, Reuters) indicate that the initial raid, which took place in Sadr City, Baghdad, involved a two-hour fight in which two Iraqis were killed and 18 wounded (from Sadr City), while one American soldier was injured. The raid targeted a Shi’a squad which was involved vigilante attacks and torturing of the Sunni.

The reaction within the Iraqi government shows the strain from the ongoing conflict with the Shi’a militia, aggravated by the fact that the Sadr faction has 30 members in parliament and holds seats in the cabinet. As reported by the Karbala News Agency, Prime Minister Maliki claimed that the operation was not authorized, yet the Iraqi defense ministry confirmed emphatically that it was authorized. A spokesman was quoted as saying that the operation took place “with the knowledge of the Iraqi government… and with the knowledge of the defense ministry, executed by forces under the authority of the ministry… with participation and support from American forces.”

Leading members of the Sadriya in parliament, as quoted in Al-Hayat, argued that U.S. forces were attempting to draw them into open conflict, something which is looking more and more inevitable as Sunni complaints of Mahdi attacks on civilians continue. Yet Iraqi President Jalal Talabani, while “mediating” between U.S. forces and the Sadrists, openly recognized that they were engaging in illegal activities. As reported separately by a KNA report and by the Al-Hayat article linked above, Talabani stood by U.S. General George Casey at a press conference and said he would ask U.S. forces to release Sadrist prisoners “incrementally” and that he also wanted the Sadrists to “avoid interfering in security matters and respect the law.” The KNA article also quoted Talabani as saying that “it is not in the interests of the government or the Sadr faction or the Americans” to engage in confrontation.

Part of the problem may be timing; with Israel and Hizballah fighting in Lebanon and criticism of Israel running high in Iraq, Maliki must have felt pressured to criticize the anti-Sadr raid. There have been several anti-Sadr raids over the past several weeks that have drawn no comment from the prime minister, although there was one in which the Shi’a interior minister claimed that an attack was unauthorized, even though the Sunni defense minister said that it was (no U.S. attacks on the Mahdi Army have taken place recently without approval from the defense ministry). The Sadrists themselves stated – and this was reported all over the Iraqi media – that the U.S. was attacking them because they were protesting over Lebanon.

Despite the split in the government caused by last week’s raid, on Sunday U.S. and Iraqi forces launched another anti-Sadr raid, but this time against Sadrists in the health ministry. According to Al-Hayat, American and Iraqi troops raided the health ministry for the third time Sunday, and arrested seven personal guards of the Sadrist minister, which suggests that they were members of the Mahdi Army. The U.S. military has not yet issued a report on the raid, but there is no indication that this raid has aroused the controversy of the previous one.

By Kirk H. Sowell at 12:45 AM | Permalink | Feedback (3)

With a full day of ceasefire in effect, Israel has begun its troop pullout from southern Lebanon, including a complete vacation of the Marjayoun corridor, taken just two days ago in an effort, now reduced to meaningless, to seal off Hizballah’s Bekaa Valley supply line into southern Lebanon.

In the ‘final ground push,’ launched only after the UN ceasefire deal had been agreed to in principle, Israel sacrificed 33 IDF soldiers. Today, any gains against Hizballah won at the cost of their sacrifice appear washed away as the Israeli withdrawal now underway creates an increasing vacuum in their wake.

The world watches long lines of Lebanese vehicles streaming back southward and celebrates the peace this signifies. But as those vehicles stream to fill the void in the south, who is to say how many of the civilians returning to their homes are Hizballah terrorists – with no uniform for identity- retaking their positions?

To that end, who is to say that Hizballah is not only celebrating a victory, but also the reconstitution of their Southern Human Shield Defense ranks?

To the south in Israel, Prime Minister Ehud Olmert faces intense criticism form all sides in the handling of the campaign against Hizballah. Seeking success that he may attach to the campaign, Olmert noted the yet-untold effects of the Israeli operations against Hizballah. Said Olmert, “(Israeli) soldiers have, to an extent not yet publicly disclosed, battered this murderous organization, its military and organizational infrastructure, its long-term capabilities, its huge arsenal, which it built over many years, and also the self-confidence of its members and leaders.”

But as Israelis indeed welcome their selfless soldiers back home and are relieved to be able to venture out of their bomb shelters in some confidence and safety, their eyes also see the Lebanese stream southward in their soldiers’ wake, too wise to believe that Hizballah is not among them, retaking their positions and celebrating their new-found legitimacy, anointed by the United Nations and approved by their chief political leader.

As many Israelis feel betrayed, they recognize that it was not out of disloyalty, but rather ineptitude to an arguable degree. There appears a very steep price to be paid by leaders within Israel, and it will likely be exacted sooner rather than later.

For as the world remains intent on celebrating what it insists is peace, Israelis can see the vacuum forming to the north before any international force is even agreed to by participants. And Israelis can here sabers continuing to be rattled, with renewed confidence, by none other than Iran.

Olmert’s fate may well be sealed neither by any specific action of his own nor criticism from other Israeli politicians, but rather by the renewed confidence in words spoken by those who seek to destroy her. For, from Iran, Ayatollah Ahmad Khatami claimed victory and declared with the confidence of a victor that Israel “must fear the day (Iran’s) 2,000-kilometre range missiles land in the heart of Tel Aviv.”

While the world is determined to celebrate ‘peace,’ Israelis are wise enough to recognize that the war has simply returned to its less visible state.

By Steve Schippert at 9:15 AM | Permalink | Feedback (1) | Referenced By (1)

The Iraqi government has closed the Baghdad offices of the Marxist Kurdistan Workers’ Party, an anti-Turkish terrorist organization, and Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki has promised his Turkish counterpar